The End of the Boeing Airbus Duopoly?

For the last few decades, Boeing and Airbus have been the biggest and best known commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world. They each have proven track records and thousands of aircraft that take to the sky each day for a wide array of commercial and private applications. While these firms have struggled to gain complete market dominance, they have largely been unchallenged in the commercial aircraft market, forming a duopoly. Today, this may be changing. The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) has developed the C919, a direct competitor to both Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 product lines (Cosgrave, 2015).

Although the COMAC C919 is just entering the market, a large hurdle continues to be certification by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which would allow the aircraft to be flown in the United States. I do think that eventually, the C919 will gain FAA certification. The United States has a very large demand for single aisle aircraft like the C919; if it can meet safety standards, it will be approved. However, I also think it will take some time before the aircraft will be certified. The FAA will likely wait to see what kind of operational performance the aircraft has in other countries and in China. After it has a more proven track record and is able to comply with FAA standards, I see the aircraft being certified and flying in the United States. The lack of certification is likely due to the fact that COMAC is a completely new aircraft manufacturer. Thus, the FAA is proceeding slowly and carefully to ensure the aircraft is safe. Ironically, many components on the aircraft are even made by U.S. manufacturers. The electrical, radar, door signal, flight control, fuel, landing gear, flight recorder, fire detection, and auxiliary power systems are manufactured in the United States (Jiang, 2015). Thus, the aircraft is composed of many reputable components from reputable manufacturers. FAA certification will simply depend on whether COMAC can assemble the components to create a safe and reliable aircraft. If the aircraft in its current state does not meet FAA standards, I think COMAC will retrofit the C919 so that it will eventually gain certification.

Assuming the C919 is certified, the problem for U.S. carriers will likely be public perception. Many Americans have a very poor regard for Chinese manufacturing and quality, regardless of the high quantity of goods manufactured there. Thus, I feel that many passengers may be reluctant to board an aircraft that was built by the same country who uses lead paint and poisonous chemicals to produce cheaply made products. Not to mention the fact that the aircraft is new, COMAC is new, and there really isn't a track record of safety for the aircraft or manufacturer. U.S. carriers may also face greater pressure when purchasing aircraft. Traditionally, the choice has been Airbus, Boeing, and other well known manufacturers, like Bombardier and Embraer. With the C919, carriers will have yet another option. Complicating the situation is the relatively cheap price for the C919; rumored to be somewhere around $50 million, which is far cheaper than equivalent Boeing and Airbus products (Johnson, 2015). This could strain the monopolized relationships between major air carriers and the legacy manufacturers. If U.S. carriers were to purchase the C919, it would almost be a guilty pleasure for them. The cost savings have the potential to be astronomical, yet at the same time public perception and manufacturer relationships may be at stake.

Entering the market on May 11th, 2008, COMAC is owned by the Chinese Government and consists of various Chinese aerospace and manufacturing companies ("About," n.d.). The overall goal of the company is to develop a commercial aviation manufacturing industry in China. In other words, it is China's turn to compete in the international commercial aircraft manufacturing market, and COMAC will be leading this charge. With well over 500 orders, the C919 will be flying mostly for airlines owned by the Chinese Government. This certainly suggests a conflict of interest; a Chinese aerospace manufacturer owned by the government will be producing aircraft primarily for airlines also owned by the Chinese Government. Thus, the aircraft has virtually no orders from the rest of the aviation world. This is likely due to the fact that COMAC remains untested by time, and air carriers have little experience with entirely Chinese produced aircraft.

COMAC is also rumored to be exploring the possibility of entering the wide-body aircraft market with the C929 aircraft, which would compete with the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380. What isn't speculation, however, is the COMAC ARJ21 aircraft. The aircraft is smaller, seating only 78 passengers ("ARJ21," n.d.). Essentially, the ARJ21 is COMAC's version of a regional jet, designed for shorter hops in the hub and spoke system. First delivery of this regional variant was scheduled for 2007; as of 2012, no ARJ21 aircraft have been delivered (Chang, 2012). Nonetheless, this aircraft will also allow COMAC to compete with Embraer, Bombardier, and other regional jet manufacturers. Now the only aircraft category COMAC is missing is wide-body.

As COMAC enters the market, I do not think it will encourage other manufacturers to follow suit. To clarify, COMAC is really not a competitor to Airbus or Boeing today. Their 517 C919 orders are largely derived from the Chinese Government, which also owns the airlines. Furthermore, COMAC is lacking the immense experience Airbus and Boeing have been building on for decades. As soon as COMAC reaches the current development level of the legacy manufacturers, they will likely be 25 or 50 years behind already (Cosgrave, 2015). The company has already suffered severe budget and delivery issues with the ARJ21 aircraft (Chang, 2012). I do not think COMAC will be able to catch up or produce a product that is superior in quality, reliability, and performance to Airbus or Boeing. I think aircraft manufacturers looking to expand into the commercial aircraft market in the shadow of COMAC will see this extreme disadvantage and remain clear of the market.

Airbus and Boeing have continued to improve upon their 737 and A320 product lines, but it is unclear if COMAC inspired the latest product developments from these manufacturing giants. Boeing, for instance, will be revealing the 737-Max, which will boast improvements in fuel efficiency and passenger comfort. Similarly, Airbus will be refreshing the A320 line with the A320neo, which will feature more fuel efficient engine options as well. I do not think these developments were designed to compete with COMAC, but instead to remain competitive in general. It will be interesting to see when the C919 is certified by the FAA and how the market will respond.

References

About us. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://english.comac.cc/aboutus/introduction/

ARJ21. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://english.comac.cc/products/rj/

Chang, G. (2012, November 25). China's aiation ABCs: Airbus, Boeing, and COMAC. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2012/11/25/chinas-aviation-abcs-airbus-boeing-and-comac/#2d23107d1048

Cosgrave, J. (2015, November 9). Is China a real threat to Boeing and Airbus? Retrieved from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/is-chinas-first-plane-a-real-threat-to-boeing-and-airbus.html

Jiang, S. (2015, November 2). China to take on Boeing, Airbus with homegrown C919 passenger jet. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/02/asia/china-new-c919-passenger-jet/

Johnson, P. (2015, December 17). Competition for Boeing as COMAC's C919 is the new kid on the block. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/pierrjohnson/2015/12/17/competition-for-boeing-as-comacs-c919-is-the-new-kid-on-the-block/#7f5adcb66c1a

Professionalism in Aviation

Fewer flights, skyrocketing fares, and smaller cities losing air carrier service. This is not a nightmare, but a grim reality of the pilot shortage that will only intensify. Experts and leaders in the industry all agree that regional air carriers are having more trouble staffing their aircraft with pilots. What experts do not agree on is why. Some industry leaders argue that there are simply not enough certificated pilots entering the field; enrollment in flight schools is down, while pilot demand is at an all time high. Birgit Anderson (2016) reveals that the number of commercial aircraft operating in the United States will rise 7.7% over the next 20 years, while only two thirds of the pilots required to fly these aircraft will be available. This side of the argument is based on simple math. A Boeing analysis reveals that over the next 20 years, the pilot demand in North America will require 95,000 pilots, while the supply of qualified pilots will only be 64,000 (Anderson, 2016). Thus, the industry will be short well over 30,000 pilots in North America alone, not to mention more severe shortages in Europe and the Middle East. Proponents of this argument point to a lack of interest in the field and related expenses to explain the shortage. Some claim that rough travel schedules, expensive education costs, and the cyclical nature of the industry have turned many away ("The Coming," 2015). Others claim that there is not a shortage of qualified pilots. Instead, there is a shortage of pay, especially in the regional airline industry. The president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) notes, "There may be a shortage of qualified pilots who are willing to fly for U.S. airlines because of the industry's recent history of instability, poor pay, and benefits" (Bachman, 2014). Supporters of this argument point to the thousands of U.S. pilots who fly for foreign carriers or who have ended their careers in aviation as a result of such poor pay. Justin Bachman (2014) reveals there are likely thousands of pilots flying for foreign carriers eager to fly in the U.S. again, but only for better compensation than what is currently offered.

Although the latter argument may be convincing, I see the pilot shortage as more than a shortage of pay. The numbers are clear; there are simply not enough qualified pilots to meet current and future airline demand. With flight school enrollment down, growing training costs, high retirement rates for legacy carriers, and a dwindling pool of military pilots, there are simply not enough qualified pilots to meet the demand. Yes, poor wages have driven thousands of pilots out of the industry or to foreign carriers. However, even if all of these pilots returned to the U.S. industry, I do not think it would be enough to compensate for the 30,000 required to meet the demand in North America over the next 20 years. There are not enough pilots to meet the demand.

The regional airlines are extremely concerned that their pool of qualified pilots is drying up. After the 2009 Colgan accident in Buffalo, New York, pilots are now required to have at least 1,500 hours of flight time to fly for an airline. Graduates of a four year aviation university are only required to have 1,000 hours of flight time; due to greater training costs, these candidates are even more sparse. Regional airlines are concerned with these regulations, as in the past, they could legally hire candidates with as few as 250 hours. Now that the minimums have increased six fold, the number of pilots qualified or willing to reach such flight minimums has drastically decreased. Part of the issue with regional carriers especially is their traditionally low pay. A starting regional pilot can expect to make only $30,000, even after years of training and upwards of $80,000 in training costs ("The Coming," 2015). Regional airlines are also concerned that their lack of pilots may seriously degrade their operational performance. Many carriers, such as Republic Airways, are unable to staff their flights. As a result, they are being sued by Delta Air Lines, and have since filed for bankruptcy ("Delta Sues," 2015).

The best solution for regional carriers is to raise wages. Providing more attractive compensation packages will draw more pilots into the industry and motivate aspiring aviators to become airline pilots. This will be difficult, as regional carriers will have to negotiate with legacy carriers for higher wages or cut expenses in other areas, if possible. Another solution is for airlines to increase their promotional and outreach programs. Visiting high schools and universities will certainly increase the appeal of the profession and encourage students to pursue the career. Establishing more pathway programs and incentives may also help. Although unlikely, if regional carriers could provide more direct compensation and oversight of collegiate aviation candidates, they would have much larger pilot pools to draw from. For instance, airlines could sign conditional offers with students and in return pay for a certain amount of training while providing guidance and support along the way.

In terms of unionization, ALPA is generally the most common airline pilot union utilized in the industry today. However, many other positions in the airline industry are part of the Teamsters Union. The Teamsters Airline Division has agreements with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), the American Aviation Labor Alliance (AALA), and more to protect thousands of ramp agents, pilots, and air traffic controllers in the industry ("Teamsters," n.d.). For aviation mechanics, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Organization represents thousands of mechanics from Southwest and Alaska Air Lines ("Aircraft Mechanics," n.d.). The aviation industry has hundreds of unions to protect virtually every position.

Professionalism is a mentality which demands a willingness to learn, take direction, and accept criticism with stride. It requires one to act in a manner which reflects personal and organizational goals. To be deemed a professional, one must exhibit a high degree of knowledge and experience in a given subject, which will be reflected through behavior and job performance. It should be easy to spot a professional given their behavior on the job and around co-workers, as well as off the job. A professional is always learning, always pushing for excellence and perfection, while leaving personal vendettas and egos at home. They will set aside personal beliefs and do their best to work with anyone to complete an objective. In aviation, a professional will always place safety as the primary concern and do everything in their power to maintain it, regardless of financial or managerial pressure.

A lack of professionalism was exhibited in the film when an airline captain was caught falsifying weight and balance data for a commercial flight to make things easier. The pilot blatantly disregarded safety, company policy, and failed to exercise Crew Resource Management (CRM) as his first officer voiced his safety concerns. A true professional would not have falsified the document, would have listened to the concerns of his first officer, and placed safety as the greatest priority. Professionalism was also lacking with management as they falsified duty time in order to get a fatigued pilot to fly one more leg home. They threatened the pilot with the fact that he would spend even more time away from home, even though he was extremely tired and likely unfit to fly. A professional manager would also place safety first, and sympathize with the pilot instead of issuing threats for not completing the mission.

I assert that the regional airline compensation structure is the primary cause of these voids in professionalism. A serious conflict of interest exists when an airline is compensated based on the completion of a flight. This places pressure on upper management, pilots, and other employees to get the job done so the airline will be paid. This is a major safety conflict, as it provides the motivation to turn a blind eye and do anything possible to keep aircraft moving. The situations where professionalism was lacking in the film seemed to be derived from the desire to keep the aircraft on time and get them to the destination, regardless of safety. Factoring in the thin profit margins provided by their contracts, compensation based on flight completion is a recipe for unsafe practices and a lack of professionalism.

I intend on maintaining my professionalism by continuing to develop my flying and decision making skills. I feel that if a pilot is not learning, he or she will not perform to the best of their ability. It is impossible to know everything, but making decisions with more knowledge and experience will certainly assist with situations which may arise in the future. I also intend on maintaining professionalism by placing safety as my first priority, regardless of any external pressure. Jobs can be replaced; people can not. It can be hard in situations where a lot of money is on the line or in extreme cases a job, but it is the duty of all airmen to operate with the highest degree of safety possible. That is professionalism in aviation.

References

Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.amfanational.org/

Anderson, B. (2016, January 28). Pilot shortage threatens to slow U.S. airline growth. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2016/01/28/pilot-shortage-threatens-to-slow-u-s-airline-growth/#30f5cc11bb6e

Bachman, J. (2014, February 11). Yes, there's a pilot shortage: Salaries start at $21,000. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-11/pilot-shortage-regional-airlines-are-cutting-flights

The coming U.S. pilot shortage is real. (2016, February 16). Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/coming-us-pilot-shortage-real

Delta sues Republic Airways over flights lost to pilot dispute. (2015, October 6). Retrieved from http://www.ibj.com/articles/55195-delta-sues-republic-airways-over-flights-lost-to-pilot-dispute

Teamsters Airline Division. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://teamsterair.org/

Space: The Final Frontier?

As commercial aviation becomes more common to the everyday traveler, the idea of commercial space expedition has certainly captured the public interest. While Elon Musk and Richard Branson soak up the press, the concepts of commercial space flight are not new. In April, 2001, Dennis Tito became the first civilian to pay for a ride to space (Jee, 2016). Charlottee Jee (2016) notes that Tito spent around $20 million to take a Russian spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS). She also reveals that Tito was only one of seven individuals privileged to pay for a trip to space, thanks to the Space Adventures firm. The last commercial space flight was conducted in 2009, when Guy Laliberte paid $35 million to Space Adventures for a trip to the ISS (Jee, 2016).

Since 2009, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Space Adventures have been on the front lines of commercial space advancement. The companies have been running tests and experiments to develop an affordable way to bring people to space. Cost is certainly the largest factor for these companies. Although Dennis Tito can afford to pay $20 million for a trip to space, many people cannot. Thus, the goal is to reduce costs in order to make commercial space flight as available as possible to the masses. Although a Virgin Galactic ticket will cost $250,000, it is still only a fraction of what others have paid to experience the thrills of space travel (Carrington, 2013). Given space travel is still extremely intricate and demanding for many of these private sector agencies, delays and reliability remain in question. Richard Branson of Virgin Galactic predicted his commercial space operation would be running by 2010; he is know aiming for a 2016 debut (Jee, 2016). Beyond these lengthy delays and frivolous costs, safety remains at the forefront of challenges for commercial space flight. In October 2014, a Virgin Galactic spacecraft crashed, leaving one dead, and in June 2015, the SpaceX Falcon 9 was destroyed shortly after launch (Jee, 2016).  

Regulation of commercial space endeavors has been relatively relaxed. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) relies on its Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) to issue permits for launches and to ensure that a spacecraft will not harm people on the ground or other craft in the air (Peterson, 2014). Andrea Peterson (2014) reveals that the AST does not certify the actual spacecraft or any other aspects of a given mission; its purpose is to ensure the safety of those on the ground. This is very different from how the FAA oversees commercial aviation activities. For instance, all aircraft, large and small, must be deemed airworthy by the FAA in order for them to legally operate. With the AST, commercial spacecraft are not required to be inspected or approved. Michael Listner of Space Law and Policy Solutions, notes, "Everybody is walking into unknown territory, and its difficult to regulate something you don't understand fully" (Davenport, 2015). The fact that commercial space flight is an "unknown endeavor," to the FAA may explain why they have had little regulatory influence over the past few years, even in the face of a fatality in 2014. As for those undertaking the risks of flying in space, the FAA is not considering those individuals passengers, but informed individuals who must be briefed on the risks and hazards of the journey they are about to undertake (Peterson, 2014).

If one is interested in piloting a commercial space craft, the requirements are not as rigorous as those to pilot fighter aircraft. Among various training requirements and the ability to withstand the stresses of space flight, the FAA only requires a space crew member to have an FAA pilot certificate and instrument rating ("Electronic Code," n.d.). Hence, a private pilot with an instrument rating capable of withstanding the forces of space and who undergoes the necessary training is eligible. Unfortunately, the major space agencies are recruiting some of the most experienced pilots in the industry. Virgin Galactic, for example, is poaching airline pilots from Virgin Atlantic (Belfiore, 2009). Michael Belfiore (2009) reveals that the hiring minimums at Virgin Galactic include 3,000 hours of flight time and ratings on a variety of aircraft; no height and weight limitations have been implemented.

I do not think commercial space flight is regulated enough. However, I think it is extremely difficult for the FAA to regulate. The FAA has essentially no experience with space flight. Thus, I feel that they should rely on the opinions and recommendations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to formulate regulations, especially for the certification of spacecraft. It is unacceptable to allow people to pay for a trip to space when they have no regulatory assurance that the craft will meet certain safety and reliability standards. Thus, commercial space craft should be treated the same as commercial aircraft; required to comply with very stringent FAA safety regulations in order to protect public interests.

Furthermore, I do not foresee the commercial space industry advancing into a widely available transportation medium. I do not think that the price per seat on-board a spacecraft will ever be affordable, even to the extremely wealthy. Although Virgin Galactic and SpaceX are working towards affordability, their target prices are still far more than many Americans make in a given year. It will take a very long time for a spacecraft to be developed and marketed at prices comparable to commercial air travel. Even spacecraft with $250,000 seat prices have yet to successfully complete their first missions. Inevitably, I feel that the commercial space industry will parallel the supersonic transportation fad. I feel that it will be too expensive to maintain, develop, and fall victim to technological limitations, economic hindrances, or devastating accidents.  

References

Belfiore, M. (2009, February). License to thrill. Retrieved from http://www.airspacemag.com/space/license-to-thrill-46607056/?no-ist

Carrington, D. (2013, August 16). What does a $250,000 ticket to space with Virgin Galactic actually buy you? Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/15/travel/virgin-galactic-250000-ticket-to-space/

Davenport, C. (2015, November 24). Space tourism is closer to taking off, but how should it be regulated? Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-thedownload-space-act-20151124-story.html

Electronic code of federal regulations. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=51e32cd954b2838b25f7eac146792f94&mc=true&node=se14.4.460_15&rgn=div8

Jee, C. (2016, February 19). Commercial space travel: A decade of broken promises. Retrieved from http://www.techworld.com/picture-gallery/personal-tech/space-tourism-decade-of-broken-promises-3630327/#9

Peterson, A. (2014, November 6). Manned commercial space flight: The final unregulated frontier. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/11/06/manned-commercial-space-flight-the-final-unregulated-frontier/

The Unfair Skies

Although most travelers are under the assumption that every airline is its own entity, separate from governmental institutions, this is not the case for many foreign, long-haul carriers. Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad Airlines, the largest and most successful in the Middle East, are actually owned by their respective governments. Qatar Airways, for instance, began operations in 1994 and was relaunched in 1997 under the mandate of the Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Laing, 2015). Lainge (2015) also reveals that when the airline was launched again, the goal was to become the international leader in customer support, quality, and efficiency. Qatar operates to more than 150 destinations using over 170 aircraft of various models, including the Airbus A380 and Boeing 777 ("The Qatar," 2016). Again, the primary ownership of the airline belongs to the government of Qatar. Emirates Airlines began flying short flights out of Dubai in 1985. With the goal of customer satisfaction, the airline expanded to well over 230 aircraft, including the Airbus A380 and Boeing 777, flying to 140 destinations worldwide ("Our Company," n.d.). The airline is currently operated by Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, a government official and relative of the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates ("His Highness," n.d.). Etihad Airways was established in 2003 by royal decree, and claims the title of the national airline of the United Arab Emirates (Corporate Profile," n.d.). The airline boasts a fleet of 120 heavy aircraft, 116 destinations, and over 14 million revenue passengers each year ("Fast Facts," 2015).

Since Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad have deep rooted government ties, they receive significant financial assistance. Laing (2015) notes that since 2004, the three carriers have received well over $42 billion in government subsidies. For carriers in the United States, especially United, American, and Delta, these boosts are distorting fair competition guaranteed by the Open Skies Agreement, leaving them unable to compete in international markets (Lainge, 2015). Although major carriers in the United States do not enjoy such lavish government funding, many foreign airlines argue that the bankruptcy laws used by Delta, United, and American are in fact a form of subsidy (Zhang, 2015). Zhang (2015) notes that these bankruptcy laws have allowed many U.S. carriers to shed debt, expensive labor contracts, and save millions in the process. In order to further their position, foreign carriers point to the fact that the United States has spent over $155 billion from 1919 through 1988 in airline subsidies (Reed, 2015). Reed (2015) explains that most of this money was actually allocated to the Federal Aviation Administration; little was actually given directly to Delta, American, or United. Furthermore, these subsidies were not used as they are now with Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar. These carriers are using subsidies to buy the most advanced aircraft, build the largest and most lavish airports, and fill them with passengers by exploiting treaties from around the world (Reed, 2015). Reed notes that subsidies given to carriers in the United States were used instead to gradually build up the aviation infrastructure, providing incentive to grow commercial passenger operations.

Fueling debates of unfair competition is the Export-Import Bank. The bank allows foreign air carriers to purchase aircraft built in the United States, primarily from Boeing, with a guarantee that their interest rates will be low (Weisman & Lipton, 2015). Delta, American, and United claim that the guarantees provided by the bank allow foreign carriers to save a significant amount of money on aircraft purchases, allowing them to reduce fares on international routes. Airlines in the United States are unable to partake in the guarantees provided by the Export-Import Bank, which is why they claim foreign carriers have yet another unfair market advantage.

Overall, I think the long haul playing field for air carriers is not a fair one. The billions in subsidies enjoyed by Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar artificially increase overall performance and utility that American carriers are be unable to keep up with. Foreign carriers always have a cushion of subsidies to fall on during periods of economic recession. Delta, American, and United must put away billions, as they will have to fend for themselves during times of slow economic growth. Thus, as foreign carriers have greater cash flow, they are able to purchase the best aircraft on the market and offer the lowest fares in the industry. Meanwhile, American carriers are forced to compete with aging aircraft and very strict budgeting guidelines. The unfair loan guarantees provided with the Export-Import Bank only exacerbate the situation, allowing foreign carriers to purchase aircraft for less.

However, I also believe that American carriers are partially using foreign government subsidies as an excuse to reduce competition and continue making record profits. Many air carriers in the United States are extremely profitable; thus they can probably afford to start purchasing more aircraft, reducing fares, or increasing the passenger experience. Yes, they need to save so when the industry falls from peak to valley, they will survive. At the same time, if an airline is making record profit, they should be able to begin investing some of the money into their infrastructure to make themselves more competitive, especially against foreign carriers. I think that if Delta, United, American, and other major carriers in the United States continue making record profits, they will have the means to become more competitive in the current environment. In the end, until foreign carriers cease to accept government subsidies and the Export-Import Bank is abolished or changed, the playing field for long-haul international air carriage will continue to operate on an unfair basis.

References

Corporate profile. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.etihad.com/en-us/about-us/corporate-profile/

Fast facts & figures [Infographic]. (2015, October). Retrieved from http://www.etihad.com/Documents/PDFs/Corporate%20profile/Fast%20facts/fast-facts-and-figures-oct2015-en.pdf

His highness sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.theemiratesgroup.com/english/our-company/leadership/hh-sheikh-ahmed-bin-saeed-al-maktoum.aspx

Laing, K. (2015, March 12). Airlines: Foreign subsidies are destroying flight competition. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/235543-airlines-foreign-subsidies-destroying-flight-competition

Our company. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.emirates.com/us/english/about/

The Qatar Airways story [Press release]. (2016, February 1).

Reed, T. (2015, April 14). U.S. airlines have paid the government $250 billion -- amazingly, some claim they are subsidized. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2015/04/14/u-s-airlines-have-paid-the-government-250-billion-amazingly-some-claim-they-are-subsidized/3/#fa36b795648e

Weisman, J., & Lipton, E. (2015, April 6). Boeing and Delta spend millions in fight over Export-Import Bank’s existence. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/business/boeing-delta-air-lines-export-import-bank.html

Zhang, B. (2015, July 28). The Middle East's 3 best airlines have infuriated their US competitors. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/middle-eastern-us-airlines-dispute-future-of-air-travel-2015-7