Iceberg Ahead: The Pilot Shortage

Arriving at the airport today, it is not uncommon to spot a flurry of cancelled airline flights. These cancelled routes are not from New York to Amsterdam or Detroit to Tokyo. Instead, they are from smaller cities that connect larger cities. These routes are typically operated by regional air carriers, which are separate entities from the major air carriers who passengers think they are flying with. Although an aircraft has a Delta Air Lines paint scheme, many passengers are surprised when they realize they are actually flying with Endeavor Air Lines or another regional affiliate. There is debate about the exact cause of the pilot shortage, but the proof is in the data. Pilot supply will only meet two-thirds of the demand. Nonetheless, these regional carriers are facing a critical shortage of pilots, which is contributing to an increase in flight cancellations. To understand the pilot shortage in its entirety, it is important to understand the extreme regulatory and monetary factors which are causing it, the impacts of the shortage, and what solutions can be implemented.

One of the greatest contributing factors of the pilot shortage is the new minimum hiring standards for regional airline pilots. In 2009, after the crash of Colgan 3407, Congress and the families of the victims of the accident increased hiring minimums to 1,500 hours of flight time from just 250 (Fitzpatrick, 2016). The problem is these requirements are now more expensive than ever to meet. Graduating with an aviation degree, the required certifications, and building the flight experience will cost upwards of $150,000 (Andersen, 2016). This may not seem extraneous, as doctors and lawyers spend the equivalent or more for their education. The key difference is what each of these graduates will be paid after they begin working. While doctors and lawyers are well into the six figures after a few years, starting airline pilots are making a measly $23,000 a year (Isidore, 2016). With such low starting salaries, it is impossible for many pilots to survive and pay off their mountain of student debt. Many pilots are so discouraged that they leave the United States to fly for other foreign carriers, which offer extremely lucrative pay and benefits. Others abandon the industry entirely, becoming disgusted with the regional airline abuse and poverty-line wages. This is one contributing factor of the looming pilot shortage.

A large component of the pilot shortage also stems from major air carriers in the United States, such as Delta, American, and United. Over the next seven years, these legacy carriers will be forced to retire 18,000 pilots (Diehl, 2015). This is a result of the mandatory retirement age of 65 for all airline pilots. This was recently extended from age 60 to 65 just a few years ago to prevent the effects of the pilot shortage and essentially purchase more time. Today, pilots who were 60 when the rule was extended are now 65, creating an iceberg of retirements. This would not prove to be such an issue if pilots existed to replace these retirees, but there are simply not enough pilots. A study conducted by Boeing reveals that over the next 20 years, the pilot supply will be 64,000, while the demand will require 95,000 pilots in North America alone (Andersen, 2016). In order to compensate for these retirements, legacy carriers are poaching pilots from their regional carriers like a vacuum. As a consequence, the regional carriers are now scrambling to replace the pilots who are moving to the major carriers, but they are having difficulty finding qualified candidates. Although legacy carriers are doing fine for now, within the next three to five years, the shear number of retirees may exceed the number of pilots being hired, creating a staffing nightmare for all air carriers while cannibalizing the pilot staff at regional airlines (Croft, 2015).

The pilot shortage is also compounded by steady growth and demand for air travel. Last year, global airline travel expanded a whopping 6% (Andersen, 2016). This immense and growing demand for air travel will be difficult for carriers to keep up with, as they are already struggling just to maintain their current route structures. Adding to the issue is the shrinking pool of airline pilots who come from the military. In the past, 60% of airline pilots came from the military, but today only 40% have a military background (Croft, 2015). Thus, as the military watches the pool of potential pilots dry up, Croft (2015) reveals that they are offering more incentives and bonuses to retain their pilots. This is even more devastating to legacy carriers, who have traditionally relied on a significant and steady flow of pilots from the military, especially given the fact they are struggling to keep pace with global demand and mandatory retirements.

The impacts of the shortage are still in their infancy, as the full brunt of shortage is still several years out. Nonetheless, the lack of pilots is having a stark impact on the airline industry today. The worst impact of the shortage is that smaller cities will continue to lose air carrier service. Regional carriers have already cut service by 10% in nearly 90 communities across the country, and some no longer have scheduled passenger service (Croft, 2015). This is only expected to worsen, as regional carriers will continue to lose pilots to legacy carriers and continue cancelling flights. Republic Airways, a regional carrier, is being sued by Delta Air Lines for failing to meet their flying responsibilities as established in their contract. Republic was forced to reduce their flying by 5%, blaming pilot staffing issues for the high cancellation numbers (Isidore, 2016). These cancellations are not limited to Republic, as nearly every regional struggles to keep their planes staffed with pilots.

This is also likely to increase fares for passengers (Andersen, 2016). As the demand for air travel grows, and the supply diminishes, the basic laws of simple economics will prevail. Fares are also likely to rise, as the costs required to attract more pilots are growing rapidly. Although pilot pay is still very low at most carriers, many regional carriers are offering signing and retention bonuses as well as pay increases. Not to mention the costs associated with increasing promotional and recruiting efforts aimed at prospective pilots. For passengers, this is an absolute nightmare. More expensive fares with fewer flights. For pilots, however, this marks one of the greatest periods to begin flying for a regional air carrier. Endeavor Air Lines, for example, is offering first year pilots $50,000 per year with lucrative retention bonuses ("Earnings," n.d.). Other airlines are following suit, which is phenomenal news for all prospective pilots.

There is not a single, simple solution to the pilot shortage, but it is clear that something must be done. One possible solution is for airlines to begin paying for pilot training. Mochado (2016) notes that the airlines will likely be forced to adopt a model used in the 1960s by United and Pacific Southwest Air Lines, where instrument and commercial training are paid for and prospective pilots are given right seat positions in airliners with very low total time. This solution will be very expensive, but many European carriers use similar methods successfully (Mochado, 2016). Yet another solution is to simply pay pilots more. Increasing wages will likely motivate more candidates to pursue the profession, and bring back those who have left the industry (Fitzpatrick, 2016). Others have argued that the mandatory retirement age for airline pilots should be increased. Japan, for instance, has a mandatory retirement age of 67 for its pilots (Diehl, 2016). Although this solution is essentially a quick patch for the shortage, merely buying time, it may help legacy carriers restructure and develop better avenues to hire more pilots.

Others have suggested implementing an Enhanced Multi-Crew Pilot license. These programs could take commercial pilots who pass existing Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) knowledge exams and put them through advanced, regimented training to prepare them to fly right seat in an airliner (Diehl, 2016). Thus, instead of building 1,500 hours of total flight time, these candidates could begin flying commercial airliners with only a few hundred hours. Such individuals would then be placed on probation, undergoing additional line and training checks before earning their full ATP certificate. The concern with such programs is that individuals may not have sufficient experience with decision making and flying in general before they sit at the controls of an airliner. At the same time these programs provide an efficient solution to alleviate the impending pilot shortage.    

The pilot shortage is real. It is just beginning, and gradually increasing in intensity. It is derived from a culmination of regulatory and monetary factors which have yet to be solved. Passengers will likely suffer from higher fares, reduced routes, and more cancelled flights than ever. Prospective pilots, however, are entering the industry at one of the best times in recent history. Increasing wages, benefits, and competition for pilots make the position more lucrative by the day. Although no one solution will solve the pilot shortage, it is clear that measures must be implemented quickly before the issue takes off.    

References

Andersen, B. (2016, January 28). Pilot shortage threatens to slow U.S. airline growth. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2016/01/28/pilot-shortage-threatens-to-slow-u-s-airline-growth/#19617c3cbb6e

Croft, J. (2015, February 3). U.S. carriers face shrinking pool of pilots. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/us-carriers-face-shrinking-pool-pilots

Diehl, A. (2015, May 8). Opinion: Here is a three pronged approach to pilot shortage. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/opinion-here-three-pronged-approach-pilot-shortage

Earning potential or upgrade potential - why choose? (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.endeavorair.com/pilots.html

Fitzpatrick, A. (2016, March 22). Here's the major crisis the airlines are facing now. Retrieved from http://time.com/4257940/pilot-shortage/

Isidore, C. (2016, February 26). Pilot shortage sends airline into bankruptcy. Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/26/news/companies/pilot-shortage-bankruptcy/

Mochado, R. (2015, July 6). The pilot shortage. Retrieved from https://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/August/Pilot/ltl

The NTSB Most Wanted

Among various accident investigation agencies, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is certainly leading the world. As they conduct their investigations, they compile data to formulate trends and make recommendations to increase the safety of various transportation and commercial industries. For 2016, the NTSB has included five most wanted items for aviation. They include, from most to least wanted, cockpit image recorders, prevent loss of control in flight, fatigue related accidents, reducing distractions, and medical fitness.

As a flight instructor, I think this ranking could be rearranged to reflect current industry concerns more realistically. I believe the ranking should begin with preventing loss of control in flight, reducing distractions, fatigue related accidents, medical fitness, and lastly, cockpit image recorders. Preventing loss of control in flight is essentially a result of poor regulation on the behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration. Today, a private pilot can go for nearly two years without flying and legally step on-board an aircraft and fly. Although in order to carry passengers, they need to accomplish just three takeoffs and landings within the preceding 90 days. Nonetheless, these regulations are not strict enough, which allows inexperienced, non-current pilots to go flying. I believe this is the root of the issue. Recreational pilots are not exercising their skills enough, they are not flying with instructors enough, and they are getting themselves killed. The NTSB adds that nearly half of general aviation accidents result from loss of control, resulting in 173 fatalities each year (Sclair, 2016). It is clear that this is the greatest problem facing aviation safety, as it is responsible for many fatalities each year and, in my opinion, is a result of lenient FAA regulations.

Reducing distractions should be ranked second because it impacts virtually all pilots, commercial or not. For example, in 2009 a Northwest Air Lines crew overflew their destination by 150 miles because they claimed to be distracted by their laptop computers (Ahlers, 2009). Not to mention that today, many air crews are using tablet technology to increase situational awareness and improve safety (Sclair, 2016). As portable electronic device technology improves, devices are becoming easier to use in the cockpit and consequently, distracting untrained crews. Given the wide availability of this technology, it should certainly be addressed with better training and perhaps new FAA regulation.

Fatigue related accidents should be third on the list, as recent reform has allowed pilots greater time to acquire sleep, however fatigue remains a contributing factor in many aviation accidents. It really comes down to the nature of flying; strange hours, mental workload, and sleeping away from home. More research into fatigue studies and the impact of fatigue on the human body may promote better pilot rest regulations and rules.

Medical fitness should be placed fourth in the list, as pilots are already screened frequently for their jobs. Although these medical exams may not be sufficient to send an individual to space, they are able to determine if pilots are fit to fly. Although this recommendation likely formed in the aftermath of the recent German Wings pilot suicide, some mental illnesses and diseases are so difficult to detect and rare that such an accident would be nearly impossible to prevent. Yes, pilots need to meet a medical standard to ensure safety. However, greater testing and a battery of mental health screening will not prove fruitful.

Cockpit image recorders should be last on the ranking because they will have little, if any, positive safety impact. Seeing the accident will only prove what investigators can hear and derive from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). Not to mention it is a reactionary measure. The purpose of such image recorders is to record an accident that already happened. Not to mention the images will need to be retrieved from the wreckage, just as the FDR and other data collection units are. The NTSB should also consider the impact of installing such devices on pilots, who are already under a litany of external pressure.

Cockpit image recorders should not have been on the list at all. Again, this is a reactionary measure to see what happened with a given accident instead of actually preventing it. Furthermore, being taped while working is not something most pilots will simply submit to. They are already being watched by passengers, the FAA, their respective company, and the general public. To be taped would essentially be an invasion of privacy, making pilots very uncomfortable. Furthermore, the technology could be disastrous if it was leaked to the public. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) of Delta flight 1141, which crashed en-route to Dallas, is still circulating the internet (Mathieu, 2010). Sounds of the crash and screams of the passengers can be heard on the tape. Releasing these videos to the flying public would certainly prove unsettling and potentially disastrous for the airlines. Mathieu (2010) notes that pilots do not want more scrutiny, and they do not have faith in the privacy and security of these devices.

One item the list should include is automation addiction. This is especially important with Part 121 and Part 135 operators, however it is also important for general aviation. The greatest danger to commercial air travel today, in my opinion, is the interaction of the pilots and the automation they are using. This was evident with the Asiana Boeing 777 which crashed in San Francisco because the pilots did not know how to properly use their automation. I feel that all pilots should receive more automation training, and be required to hand fly the aircraft more so that when automation begins to fail, they are comfortable taking over and flying manually. Although the United States is handling this issue better than other countries, I feel that if action is not taken on the behalf of the FAA, airlines, and aircraft manufacturers, automation related accidents will continue.

Of the items listed, I feel that the FAA will respond most to reducing distractions, medical fitness, and preventing the loss of control in flight. The reason for this is that these issues are directly related to improving safety, and can be addressed with research and regulatory reform. These items have been directly involved in several accidents around the world, and may provide a measurable safety improvement. Fatigue related accidents may not be addressed since the FAA has recently conducted research and created new pilot rest regulations, however the issue remains important. The FAA will probably not react to cockpit image recorders, as it is a rearward looking measure that does not progressively approach safety. The FAA also feels the pressure from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) as well as other pilot unions and representatives to prevent such technology from entering the cockpit.

References

Ahlers, M. (2009, October 22). Airliner crew flies 150 miles past airport. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/10/22/airliner.fly.by/index.html?iref=24hours

Mathieu, S. (2010, September 28). Video in the cockpit: Privacy vs safety. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39383365/ns/travel/t/video-cockpit-privacy-vs-safety/#.Vwq9IfkrKUk

Sclair, B. (2016, January 18). Aviation fares better on NTSB's most wated list. Retrieved from http://generalaviationnews.com/2016/01/18/aviation-fares-better-on-ntsbs-most-wanted-list/

Aviation Associations

One organization I intend on joining is the American Institute of  Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). The purpose of the AIAA is, "to ignite and celebrate aerospace ingenuity and collaboration, and its importance to our way of life" ("About," n.d.). The organization, founded in 1963, boasts 30,000 members from various countries across the globe. In addition to advocating for global aerospace and astronautics, the group has published well over 300 books and 200,000 technical articles. The overall focus of this association is to bring the world together to discuss key topics in the aerospace industry. These topics are diverse, and cover engineering, environmental, communication, and various other technical areas of the industry. To promote these ideas, AIAA hosts various seminars and publishes various articles to spark interest and further industry discussion. They also value teachers and educators in the industry, as well as those who are on the front lines of development and innovation. Since 1972, AIAA has provided input to Congress regarding technical, economical, or other aerospace innovations to inform legislators and champion key aviation legislation ("About," n.d.).

The primary reason I am interested in the AIAA is that they are leading the aviation industry from an all encompassing perspective. Not only are they involved in global aerospace policy, but they are also involved with the actual innovators and teachers who are moving the industry forward. It is important to have a complete understanding of all aspects of the aviation industry in order to have a better picture of where it is heading and the current problems it is facing. The global perspective the association provides also widens the aerospace landscape, providing a more complete industry analysis.

Yet another aviation organization I intend on joining is the Airline Pilots Association, International (ALPA). This organization represents 52,000 pilots and 30 individual airlines, with the goal of providing airline safety, security, as well as pilot assistance, advocacy, and representation ("What," n.d.). Since 1931, ALPA has been one of the largest pilot advocacy groups in aviation. They are focused on protecting and ensuring the safety of their pilots, as well as promoting airline travel. In reality, ALPA is very well known for advocating airline safety. They frequently assist and lobby congress with various aviation topics in order to promote safety and security. They are essentially the voice of many airline pilots in the United States, carrying significant influence as a result. Most recently, ALPA boasts the refinement of pilot rest rules based on scientific evidence as one of their greatest achievements in terms of safety and professionalism ("What," n.d.).

My interest in ALPA stems from the fact that I am planning on flying for an airline within the next few months. Beyond that, I think ALPA is generally good in the industry. I believe they have good intentions, and they are promoting aviation safety with a multifaceted approach. Their large influence enables them to provide legislative pressure, which can be used to make the industry more safe and professional for all pilots. Although ALPA is a more mainstream organization, I feel that given its large influence and vast experience with safety, their ideas are important and are worth considering.

Again, it is important to belong to these organizations to understand what is happening in the aviation world. The AIAA provides an impressive perspective of the global aerospace industry, stemming beyond just the airline perspective that I will be involved with. A true professional, in my opinion, should be aware of the developments in the entire industry. At the same time, it is important to join ALPA since they are the most influential voice for airline pilots. As I will soon be an airline pilot, I feel that it is important to have an even deeper connection to the airline industry as a whole. ALPA will certinaly be advocating for legislation and ideas that will impact my life and career, which is extremely important.

References

About AIAA. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.aiaa.org/AboutAIAA/

What we do - ALPA. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.alpa.org/about-alpa/what-we-do

The End of the Boeing Airbus Duopoly?

For the last few decades, Boeing and Airbus have been the biggest and best known commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world. They each have proven track records and thousands of aircraft that take to the sky each day for a wide array of commercial and private applications. While these firms have struggled to gain complete market dominance, they have largely been unchallenged in the commercial aircraft market, forming a duopoly. Today, this may be changing. The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) has developed the C919, a direct competitor to both Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 product lines (Cosgrave, 2015).

Although the COMAC C919 is just entering the market, a large hurdle continues to be certification by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which would allow the aircraft to be flown in the United States. I do think that eventually, the C919 will gain FAA certification. The United States has a very large demand for single aisle aircraft like the C919; if it can meet safety standards, it will be approved. However, I also think it will take some time before the aircraft will be certified. The FAA will likely wait to see what kind of operational performance the aircraft has in other countries and in China. After it has a more proven track record and is able to comply with FAA standards, I see the aircraft being certified and flying in the United States. The lack of certification is likely due to the fact that COMAC is a completely new aircraft manufacturer. Thus, the FAA is proceeding slowly and carefully to ensure the aircraft is safe. Ironically, many components on the aircraft are even made by U.S. manufacturers. The electrical, radar, door signal, flight control, fuel, landing gear, flight recorder, fire detection, and auxiliary power systems are manufactured in the United States (Jiang, 2015). Thus, the aircraft is composed of many reputable components from reputable manufacturers. FAA certification will simply depend on whether COMAC can assemble the components to create a safe and reliable aircraft. If the aircraft in its current state does not meet FAA standards, I think COMAC will retrofit the C919 so that it will eventually gain certification.

Assuming the C919 is certified, the problem for U.S. carriers will likely be public perception. Many Americans have a very poor regard for Chinese manufacturing and quality, regardless of the high quantity of goods manufactured there. Thus, I feel that many passengers may be reluctant to board an aircraft that was built by the same country who uses lead paint and poisonous chemicals to produce cheaply made products. Not to mention the fact that the aircraft is new, COMAC is new, and there really isn't a track record of safety for the aircraft or manufacturer. U.S. carriers may also face greater pressure when purchasing aircraft. Traditionally, the choice has been Airbus, Boeing, and other well known manufacturers, like Bombardier and Embraer. With the C919, carriers will have yet another option. Complicating the situation is the relatively cheap price for the C919; rumored to be somewhere around $50 million, which is far cheaper than equivalent Boeing and Airbus products (Johnson, 2015). This could strain the monopolized relationships between major air carriers and the legacy manufacturers. If U.S. carriers were to purchase the C919, it would almost be a guilty pleasure for them. The cost savings have the potential to be astronomical, yet at the same time public perception and manufacturer relationships may be at stake.

Entering the market on May 11th, 2008, COMAC is owned by the Chinese Government and consists of various Chinese aerospace and manufacturing companies ("About," n.d.). The overall goal of the company is to develop a commercial aviation manufacturing industry in China. In other words, it is China's turn to compete in the international commercial aircraft manufacturing market, and COMAC will be leading this charge. With well over 500 orders, the C919 will be flying mostly for airlines owned by the Chinese Government. This certainly suggests a conflict of interest; a Chinese aerospace manufacturer owned by the government will be producing aircraft primarily for airlines also owned by the Chinese Government. Thus, the aircraft has virtually no orders from the rest of the aviation world. This is likely due to the fact that COMAC remains untested by time, and air carriers have little experience with entirely Chinese produced aircraft.

COMAC is also rumored to be exploring the possibility of entering the wide-body aircraft market with the C929 aircraft, which would compete with the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380. What isn't speculation, however, is the COMAC ARJ21 aircraft. The aircraft is smaller, seating only 78 passengers ("ARJ21," n.d.). Essentially, the ARJ21 is COMAC's version of a regional jet, designed for shorter hops in the hub and spoke system. First delivery of this regional variant was scheduled for 2007; as of 2012, no ARJ21 aircraft have been delivered (Chang, 2012). Nonetheless, this aircraft will also allow COMAC to compete with Embraer, Bombardier, and other regional jet manufacturers. Now the only aircraft category COMAC is missing is wide-body.

As COMAC enters the market, I do not think it will encourage other manufacturers to follow suit. To clarify, COMAC is really not a competitor to Airbus or Boeing today. Their 517 C919 orders are largely derived from the Chinese Government, which also owns the airlines. Furthermore, COMAC is lacking the immense experience Airbus and Boeing have been building on for decades. As soon as COMAC reaches the current development level of the legacy manufacturers, they will likely be 25 or 50 years behind already (Cosgrave, 2015). The company has already suffered severe budget and delivery issues with the ARJ21 aircraft (Chang, 2012). I do not think COMAC will be able to catch up or produce a product that is superior in quality, reliability, and performance to Airbus or Boeing. I think aircraft manufacturers looking to expand into the commercial aircraft market in the shadow of COMAC will see this extreme disadvantage and remain clear of the market.

Airbus and Boeing have continued to improve upon their 737 and A320 product lines, but it is unclear if COMAC inspired the latest product developments from these manufacturing giants. Boeing, for instance, will be revealing the 737-Max, which will boast improvements in fuel efficiency and passenger comfort. Similarly, Airbus will be refreshing the A320 line with the A320neo, which will feature more fuel efficient engine options as well. I do not think these developments were designed to compete with COMAC, but instead to remain competitive in general. It will be interesting to see when the C919 is certified by the FAA and how the market will respond.

References

About us. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://english.comac.cc/aboutus/introduction/

ARJ21. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://english.comac.cc/products/rj/

Chang, G. (2012, November 25). China's aiation ABCs: Airbus, Boeing, and COMAC. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2012/11/25/chinas-aviation-abcs-airbus-boeing-and-comac/#2d23107d1048

Cosgrave, J. (2015, November 9). Is China a real threat to Boeing and Airbus? Retrieved from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/is-chinas-first-plane-a-real-threat-to-boeing-and-airbus.html

Jiang, S. (2015, November 2). China to take on Boeing, Airbus with homegrown C919 passenger jet. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/02/asia/china-new-c919-passenger-jet/

Johnson, P. (2015, December 17). Competition for Boeing as COMAC's C919 is the new kid on the block. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/pierrjohnson/2015/12/17/competition-for-boeing-as-comacs-c919-is-the-new-kid-on-the-block/#7f5adcb66c1a

Professionalism in Aviation

Fewer flights, skyrocketing fares, and smaller cities losing air carrier service. This is not a nightmare, but a grim reality of the pilot shortage that will only intensify. Experts and leaders in the industry all agree that regional air carriers are having more trouble staffing their aircraft with pilots. What experts do not agree on is why. Some industry leaders argue that there are simply not enough certificated pilots entering the field; enrollment in flight schools is down, while pilot demand is at an all time high. Birgit Anderson (2016) reveals that the number of commercial aircraft operating in the United States will rise 7.7% over the next 20 years, while only two thirds of the pilots required to fly these aircraft will be available. This side of the argument is based on simple math. A Boeing analysis reveals that over the next 20 years, the pilot demand in North America will require 95,000 pilots, while the supply of qualified pilots will only be 64,000 (Anderson, 2016). Thus, the industry will be short well over 30,000 pilots in North America alone, not to mention more severe shortages in Europe and the Middle East. Proponents of this argument point to a lack of interest in the field and related expenses to explain the shortage. Some claim that rough travel schedules, expensive education costs, and the cyclical nature of the industry have turned many away ("The Coming," 2015). Others claim that there is not a shortage of qualified pilots. Instead, there is a shortage of pay, especially in the regional airline industry. The president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) notes, "There may be a shortage of qualified pilots who are willing to fly for U.S. airlines because of the industry's recent history of instability, poor pay, and benefits" (Bachman, 2014). Supporters of this argument point to the thousands of U.S. pilots who fly for foreign carriers or who have ended their careers in aviation as a result of such poor pay. Justin Bachman (2014) reveals there are likely thousands of pilots flying for foreign carriers eager to fly in the U.S. again, but only for better compensation than what is currently offered.

Although the latter argument may be convincing, I see the pilot shortage as more than a shortage of pay. The numbers are clear; there are simply not enough qualified pilots to meet current and future airline demand. With flight school enrollment down, growing training costs, high retirement rates for legacy carriers, and a dwindling pool of military pilots, there are simply not enough qualified pilots to meet the demand. Yes, poor wages have driven thousands of pilots out of the industry or to foreign carriers. However, even if all of these pilots returned to the U.S. industry, I do not think it would be enough to compensate for the 30,000 required to meet the demand in North America over the next 20 years. There are not enough pilots to meet the demand.

The regional airlines are extremely concerned that their pool of qualified pilots is drying up. After the 2009 Colgan accident in Buffalo, New York, pilots are now required to have at least 1,500 hours of flight time to fly for an airline. Graduates of a four year aviation university are only required to have 1,000 hours of flight time; due to greater training costs, these candidates are even more sparse. Regional airlines are concerned with these regulations, as in the past, they could legally hire candidates with as few as 250 hours. Now that the minimums have increased six fold, the number of pilots qualified or willing to reach such flight minimums has drastically decreased. Part of the issue with regional carriers especially is their traditionally low pay. A starting regional pilot can expect to make only $30,000, even after years of training and upwards of $80,000 in training costs ("The Coming," 2015). Regional airlines are also concerned that their lack of pilots may seriously degrade their operational performance. Many carriers, such as Republic Airways, are unable to staff their flights. As a result, they are being sued by Delta Air Lines, and have since filed for bankruptcy ("Delta Sues," 2015).

The best solution for regional carriers is to raise wages. Providing more attractive compensation packages will draw more pilots into the industry and motivate aspiring aviators to become airline pilots. This will be difficult, as regional carriers will have to negotiate with legacy carriers for higher wages or cut expenses in other areas, if possible. Another solution is for airlines to increase their promotional and outreach programs. Visiting high schools and universities will certainly increase the appeal of the profession and encourage students to pursue the career. Establishing more pathway programs and incentives may also help. Although unlikely, if regional carriers could provide more direct compensation and oversight of collegiate aviation candidates, they would have much larger pilot pools to draw from. For instance, airlines could sign conditional offers with students and in return pay for a certain amount of training while providing guidance and support along the way.

In terms of unionization, ALPA is generally the most common airline pilot union utilized in the industry today. However, many other positions in the airline industry are part of the Teamsters Union. The Teamsters Airline Division has agreements with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), the American Aviation Labor Alliance (AALA), and more to protect thousands of ramp agents, pilots, and air traffic controllers in the industry ("Teamsters," n.d.). For aviation mechanics, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Organization represents thousands of mechanics from Southwest and Alaska Air Lines ("Aircraft Mechanics," n.d.). The aviation industry has hundreds of unions to protect virtually every position.

Professionalism is a mentality which demands a willingness to learn, take direction, and accept criticism with stride. It requires one to act in a manner which reflects personal and organizational goals. To be deemed a professional, one must exhibit a high degree of knowledge and experience in a given subject, which will be reflected through behavior and job performance. It should be easy to spot a professional given their behavior on the job and around co-workers, as well as off the job. A professional is always learning, always pushing for excellence and perfection, while leaving personal vendettas and egos at home. They will set aside personal beliefs and do their best to work with anyone to complete an objective. In aviation, a professional will always place safety as the primary concern and do everything in their power to maintain it, regardless of financial or managerial pressure.

A lack of professionalism was exhibited in the film when an airline captain was caught falsifying weight and balance data for a commercial flight to make things easier. The pilot blatantly disregarded safety, company policy, and failed to exercise Crew Resource Management (CRM) as his first officer voiced his safety concerns. A true professional would not have falsified the document, would have listened to the concerns of his first officer, and placed safety as the greatest priority. Professionalism was also lacking with management as they falsified duty time in order to get a fatigued pilot to fly one more leg home. They threatened the pilot with the fact that he would spend even more time away from home, even though he was extremely tired and likely unfit to fly. A professional manager would also place safety first, and sympathize with the pilot instead of issuing threats for not completing the mission.

I assert that the regional airline compensation structure is the primary cause of these voids in professionalism. A serious conflict of interest exists when an airline is compensated based on the completion of a flight. This places pressure on upper management, pilots, and other employees to get the job done so the airline will be paid. This is a major safety conflict, as it provides the motivation to turn a blind eye and do anything possible to keep aircraft moving. The situations where professionalism was lacking in the film seemed to be derived from the desire to keep the aircraft on time and get them to the destination, regardless of safety. Factoring in the thin profit margins provided by their contracts, compensation based on flight completion is a recipe for unsafe practices and a lack of professionalism.

I intend on maintaining my professionalism by continuing to develop my flying and decision making skills. I feel that if a pilot is not learning, he or she will not perform to the best of their ability. It is impossible to know everything, but making decisions with more knowledge and experience will certainly assist with situations which may arise in the future. I also intend on maintaining professionalism by placing safety as my first priority, regardless of any external pressure. Jobs can be replaced; people can not. It can be hard in situations where a lot of money is on the line or in extreme cases a job, but it is the duty of all airmen to operate with the highest degree of safety possible. That is professionalism in aviation.

References

Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.amfanational.org/

Anderson, B. (2016, January 28). Pilot shortage threatens to slow U.S. airline growth. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2016/01/28/pilot-shortage-threatens-to-slow-u-s-airline-growth/#30f5cc11bb6e

Bachman, J. (2014, February 11). Yes, there's a pilot shortage: Salaries start at $21,000. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-11/pilot-shortage-regional-airlines-are-cutting-flights

The coming U.S. pilot shortage is real. (2016, February 16). Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/coming-us-pilot-shortage-real

Delta sues Republic Airways over flights lost to pilot dispute. (2015, October 6). Retrieved from http://www.ibj.com/articles/55195-delta-sues-republic-airways-over-flights-lost-to-pilot-dispute

Teamsters Airline Division. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://teamsterair.org/

Space: The Final Frontier?

As commercial aviation becomes more common to the everyday traveler, the idea of commercial space expedition has certainly captured the public interest. While Elon Musk and Richard Branson soak up the press, the concepts of commercial space flight are not new. In April, 2001, Dennis Tito became the first civilian to pay for a ride to space (Jee, 2016). Charlottee Jee (2016) notes that Tito spent around $20 million to take a Russian spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS). She also reveals that Tito was only one of seven individuals privileged to pay for a trip to space, thanks to the Space Adventures firm. The last commercial space flight was conducted in 2009, when Guy Laliberte paid $35 million to Space Adventures for a trip to the ISS (Jee, 2016).

Since 2009, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Space Adventures have been on the front lines of commercial space advancement. The companies have been running tests and experiments to develop an affordable way to bring people to space. Cost is certainly the largest factor for these companies. Although Dennis Tito can afford to pay $20 million for a trip to space, many people cannot. Thus, the goal is to reduce costs in order to make commercial space flight as available as possible to the masses. Although a Virgin Galactic ticket will cost $250,000, it is still only a fraction of what others have paid to experience the thrills of space travel (Carrington, 2013). Given space travel is still extremely intricate and demanding for many of these private sector agencies, delays and reliability remain in question. Richard Branson of Virgin Galactic predicted his commercial space operation would be running by 2010; he is know aiming for a 2016 debut (Jee, 2016). Beyond these lengthy delays and frivolous costs, safety remains at the forefront of challenges for commercial space flight. In October 2014, a Virgin Galactic spacecraft crashed, leaving one dead, and in June 2015, the SpaceX Falcon 9 was destroyed shortly after launch (Jee, 2016).  

Regulation of commercial space endeavors has been relatively relaxed. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) relies on its Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) to issue permits for launches and to ensure that a spacecraft will not harm people on the ground or other craft in the air (Peterson, 2014). Andrea Peterson (2014) reveals that the AST does not certify the actual spacecraft or any other aspects of a given mission; its purpose is to ensure the safety of those on the ground. This is very different from how the FAA oversees commercial aviation activities. For instance, all aircraft, large and small, must be deemed airworthy by the FAA in order for them to legally operate. With the AST, commercial spacecraft are not required to be inspected or approved. Michael Listner of Space Law and Policy Solutions, notes, "Everybody is walking into unknown territory, and its difficult to regulate something you don't understand fully" (Davenport, 2015). The fact that commercial space flight is an "unknown endeavor," to the FAA may explain why they have had little regulatory influence over the past few years, even in the face of a fatality in 2014. As for those undertaking the risks of flying in space, the FAA is not considering those individuals passengers, but informed individuals who must be briefed on the risks and hazards of the journey they are about to undertake (Peterson, 2014).

If one is interested in piloting a commercial space craft, the requirements are not as rigorous as those to pilot fighter aircraft. Among various training requirements and the ability to withstand the stresses of space flight, the FAA only requires a space crew member to have an FAA pilot certificate and instrument rating ("Electronic Code," n.d.). Hence, a private pilot with an instrument rating capable of withstanding the forces of space and who undergoes the necessary training is eligible. Unfortunately, the major space agencies are recruiting some of the most experienced pilots in the industry. Virgin Galactic, for example, is poaching airline pilots from Virgin Atlantic (Belfiore, 2009). Michael Belfiore (2009) reveals that the hiring minimums at Virgin Galactic include 3,000 hours of flight time and ratings on a variety of aircraft; no height and weight limitations have been implemented.

I do not think commercial space flight is regulated enough. However, I think it is extremely difficult for the FAA to regulate. The FAA has essentially no experience with space flight. Thus, I feel that they should rely on the opinions and recommendations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to formulate regulations, especially for the certification of spacecraft. It is unacceptable to allow people to pay for a trip to space when they have no regulatory assurance that the craft will meet certain safety and reliability standards. Thus, commercial space craft should be treated the same as commercial aircraft; required to comply with very stringent FAA safety regulations in order to protect public interests.

Furthermore, I do not foresee the commercial space industry advancing into a widely available transportation medium. I do not think that the price per seat on-board a spacecraft will ever be affordable, even to the extremely wealthy. Although Virgin Galactic and SpaceX are working towards affordability, their target prices are still far more than many Americans make in a given year. It will take a very long time for a spacecraft to be developed and marketed at prices comparable to commercial air travel. Even spacecraft with $250,000 seat prices have yet to successfully complete their first missions. Inevitably, I feel that the commercial space industry will parallel the supersonic transportation fad. I feel that it will be too expensive to maintain, develop, and fall victim to technological limitations, economic hindrances, or devastating accidents.  

References

Belfiore, M. (2009, February). License to thrill. Retrieved from http://www.airspacemag.com/space/license-to-thrill-46607056/?no-ist

Carrington, D. (2013, August 16). What does a $250,000 ticket to space with Virgin Galactic actually buy you? Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/15/travel/virgin-galactic-250000-ticket-to-space/

Davenport, C. (2015, November 24). Space tourism is closer to taking off, but how should it be regulated? Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-thedownload-space-act-20151124-story.html

Electronic code of federal regulations. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=51e32cd954b2838b25f7eac146792f94&mc=true&node=se14.4.460_15&rgn=div8

Jee, C. (2016, February 19). Commercial space travel: A decade of broken promises. Retrieved from http://www.techworld.com/picture-gallery/personal-tech/space-tourism-decade-of-broken-promises-3630327/#9

Peterson, A. (2014, November 6). Manned commercial space flight: The final unregulated frontier. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/11/06/manned-commercial-space-flight-the-final-unregulated-frontier/

The Unfair Skies

Although most travelers are under the assumption that every airline is its own entity, separate from governmental institutions, this is not the case for many foreign, long-haul carriers. Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad Airlines, the largest and most successful in the Middle East, are actually owned by their respective governments. Qatar Airways, for instance, began operations in 1994 and was relaunched in 1997 under the mandate of the Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Laing, 2015). Lainge (2015) also reveals that when the airline was launched again, the goal was to become the international leader in customer support, quality, and efficiency. Qatar operates to more than 150 destinations using over 170 aircraft of various models, including the Airbus A380 and Boeing 777 ("The Qatar," 2016). Again, the primary ownership of the airline belongs to the government of Qatar. Emirates Airlines began flying short flights out of Dubai in 1985. With the goal of customer satisfaction, the airline expanded to well over 230 aircraft, including the Airbus A380 and Boeing 777, flying to 140 destinations worldwide ("Our Company," n.d.). The airline is currently operated by Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, a government official and relative of the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates ("His Highness," n.d.). Etihad Airways was established in 2003 by royal decree, and claims the title of the national airline of the United Arab Emirates (Corporate Profile," n.d.). The airline boasts a fleet of 120 heavy aircraft, 116 destinations, and over 14 million revenue passengers each year ("Fast Facts," 2015).

Since Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad have deep rooted government ties, they receive significant financial assistance. Laing (2015) notes that since 2004, the three carriers have received well over $42 billion in government subsidies. For carriers in the United States, especially United, American, and Delta, these boosts are distorting fair competition guaranteed by the Open Skies Agreement, leaving them unable to compete in international markets (Lainge, 2015). Although major carriers in the United States do not enjoy such lavish government funding, many foreign airlines argue that the bankruptcy laws used by Delta, United, and American are in fact a form of subsidy (Zhang, 2015). Zhang (2015) notes that these bankruptcy laws have allowed many U.S. carriers to shed debt, expensive labor contracts, and save millions in the process. In order to further their position, foreign carriers point to the fact that the United States has spent over $155 billion from 1919 through 1988 in airline subsidies (Reed, 2015). Reed (2015) explains that most of this money was actually allocated to the Federal Aviation Administration; little was actually given directly to Delta, American, or United. Furthermore, these subsidies were not used as they are now with Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar. These carriers are using subsidies to buy the most advanced aircraft, build the largest and most lavish airports, and fill them with passengers by exploiting treaties from around the world (Reed, 2015). Reed notes that subsidies given to carriers in the United States were used instead to gradually build up the aviation infrastructure, providing incentive to grow commercial passenger operations.

Fueling debates of unfair competition is the Export-Import Bank. The bank allows foreign air carriers to purchase aircraft built in the United States, primarily from Boeing, with a guarantee that their interest rates will be low (Weisman & Lipton, 2015). Delta, American, and United claim that the guarantees provided by the bank allow foreign carriers to save a significant amount of money on aircraft purchases, allowing them to reduce fares on international routes. Airlines in the United States are unable to partake in the guarantees provided by the Export-Import Bank, which is why they claim foreign carriers have yet another unfair market advantage.

Overall, I think the long haul playing field for air carriers is not a fair one. The billions in subsidies enjoyed by Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar artificially increase overall performance and utility that American carriers are be unable to keep up with. Foreign carriers always have a cushion of subsidies to fall on during periods of economic recession. Delta, American, and United must put away billions, as they will have to fend for themselves during times of slow economic growth. Thus, as foreign carriers have greater cash flow, they are able to purchase the best aircraft on the market and offer the lowest fares in the industry. Meanwhile, American carriers are forced to compete with aging aircraft and very strict budgeting guidelines. The unfair loan guarantees provided with the Export-Import Bank only exacerbate the situation, allowing foreign carriers to purchase aircraft for less.

However, I also believe that American carriers are partially using foreign government subsidies as an excuse to reduce competition and continue making record profits. Many air carriers in the United States are extremely profitable; thus they can probably afford to start purchasing more aircraft, reducing fares, or increasing the passenger experience. Yes, they need to save so when the industry falls from peak to valley, they will survive. At the same time, if an airline is making record profit, they should be able to begin investing some of the money into their infrastructure to make themselves more competitive, especially against foreign carriers. I think that if Delta, United, American, and other major carriers in the United States continue making record profits, they will have the means to become more competitive in the current environment. In the end, until foreign carriers cease to accept government subsidies and the Export-Import Bank is abolished or changed, the playing field for long-haul international air carriage will continue to operate on an unfair basis.

References

Corporate profile. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.etihad.com/en-us/about-us/corporate-profile/

Fast facts & figures [Infographic]. (2015, October). Retrieved from http://www.etihad.com/Documents/PDFs/Corporate%20profile/Fast%20facts/fast-facts-and-figures-oct2015-en.pdf

His highness sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.theemiratesgroup.com/english/our-company/leadership/hh-sheikh-ahmed-bin-saeed-al-maktoum.aspx

Laing, K. (2015, March 12). Airlines: Foreign subsidies are destroying flight competition. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/235543-airlines-foreign-subsidies-destroying-flight-competition

Our company. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.emirates.com/us/english/about/

The Qatar Airways story [Press release]. (2016, February 1).

Reed, T. (2015, April 14). U.S. airlines have paid the government $250 billion -- amazingly, some claim they are subsidized. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2015/04/14/u-s-airlines-have-paid-the-government-250-billion-amazingly-some-claim-they-are-subsidized/3/#fa36b795648e

Weisman, J., & Lipton, E. (2015, April 6). Boeing and Delta spend millions in fight over Export-Import Bank’s existence. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/business/boeing-delta-air-lines-export-import-bank.html

Zhang, B. (2015, July 28). The Middle East's 3 best airlines have infuriated their US competitors. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/middle-eastern-us-airlines-dispute-future-of-air-travel-2015-7

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have certainly captured the attention of millions of Americans, aviation enthusiasts, governmental entities, and nearly everyone in between. Although the technology has already been integrated into a plethora of military applications, UAVs have already settled into select civilian applications. Perhaps one of the most well known civilian applications of the technology is the film industry in the United States. Smaller UAVs equipped with professional grade cameras are able to capture images from angles and heights previously out of reach or too dangerous to attempt. Although large scale films, such as Chappie, utilize drones, many amateur film makers are also using the devices to capture the perfect shot ("Five," 2015). Drones are also being employed to increase marketing efficiency. Marketing developers at AdNear use drones equipped with cell phone detecting equipment to capture data from people in the San Fernando Valley to direct personalized advertisements to cell phone owners below (Paganini, 2015). UAVs have even touched the academic and scientific communities across the country. Several universities, along with NASA, have developed drones capable of flying into hurricanes and other violent weather systems ("Five," 2015). The images and data collected by the drones, too dangerous to collect with a conventional aircraft, will help scientists learn more about hurricane development and forecasting. UAVs are also employed for agricultural purposes. Many farmers are purchasing the drones to survey their land, gather better topographical information, and in turn, adjust when they harvest as well as how they apply their chemicals (Doering, 2014).

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently the regulatory agency tasked with drone enforcement and regulation on the civilian end. As of late 2015, recreational drones weighing 250 grams through 55 pounds must be registered with the FAA ("UAS," n.d.). The FAA also maintains that penalties for failing to register or have proof of registration range from $27,500 in civil penalties and up to $250,000 in criminal penalties with a maximum of three years in jail. For commercial UAV applications, the process for registration is more than a quick online session and a $5 fee. Those who wish to operate the aircraft for commercial purposes must either apply for a Section 333 Exemption or Special Airworthiness Certificate, both of which require far more paperwork and time ("Civil," n.d.).

Although commercial drone applications have not quite blossomed, many companies are hiring drone pilots and engineers now to prepare for the UAV craze. Amazon and Facebook, for instance, are opening the gates for UAV operators and logistical engineers to bring their unmanned programs to life (Rooney, 2014). Rooney (2014) reveals that in the next 10 years, the UAV industry will create upwards of 100,000 jobs. He notes that although the market is still in its infancy, major players such as Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin are hiring UAV specialists from top universities across the country.  

With regard to military applications, UAVs have changed the overall utility of air support. Instead of sending a manned aircraft into a risky area, a UAV will gladly accept such missions without hesitation. The United States Air Force (USAF) typically uses the devices for high risk situations, including reconnaissance, bomb detection, surveying enemy troops, providing air support, and striking select targets ("Drones," 2012). Although the drones may cost $12 million each, many modern fighter aircraft in the military cost at least ten times as much (Ratnesar, 2013). In terms of effectiveness, Ratnesar (2013) also reveals that the civilian casualty rate for drone strikes is 17 percent compared to other military operations that range anywhere from 30 to 80 percent. Although these statistics are still unfortunate, it is clear that military UAV applications are more accurate, more effective, and result in fewer casualties than traditional military endeavors.

I do not foresee UAV aircraft integrating into the National Airspace System (NAS). I feel that the risk posed while operating around other commercial or recreational aircraft is too great to warrant such proposals. Today, UAV technology is not able to replace the critical thinking skills of a human pilot on-board an aircraft. Until this happens, it is too risky to place a gadget anywhere near other aircraft in the airspace system. The potential for losing a drone or a simple mistake by an amateur UAV pilot could wreak havoc for a commercial airliner. We have already seen drones penetrating restricted airspace, landing on the White House lawn, and disrupting emergency operations, to name a few (Paganini, 2015). The public, with knowledge of the threats posed by these small devices, will certainly object the idea of UAVs flying near passenger carrying aircraft, regardless of any inherent redundancies proposed in the integration processes. From a logistical standpoint, there is no infrastructure to facilitate UAV communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC), other pilots, and no airspace designated solely for drone operation. Although some integration plans call for an entire section of the NAS to be used for the sole purpose of drone operations, the high volume of air traffic already present will not be able to accommodate another special use airspace, especially in urban areas. Safe drone integration, with our current technology, is not feasible.

References

Civil operations. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/

Doering, C. (2014, March 23). Growing use of drones poised to transform agriculture. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/23/drones-agriculture-growth/6665561/

Drones: What are they and how do they work? (2012, January 31). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10713898

Five awesome uses for drone technology. (2015, November 17). Retrieved from http://phys.org/news/2015-11-awesome-drone-technology.html

Paganini, P. (2015, March 31). Why civilian drone use is a risky business. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2015/03/31/why-civilian-drone-use-is-risky-business.html

Ratnesar, R. (2013, May 23). Five reasons why drones are here to stay. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-05-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay

Rooney, B. (2014, November 26). Drone pilot wanted: Starting salary $100,000. Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/25/news/drone-pilot-degree/

UAS registration Q&A. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/uas/registration/faqs/

       

A Tiring Battle: Pilot Rest

In February, 2009, a small commuter aircraft crashed near Buffalo, New York. The flight, operated by Colgan Airlines, was piloted by an extremely fatigued crew. The first officer was even sick, and regularly commuted from the east coast to the west coast just to begin her work day. The families of the 50 people who perished were outraged, lobbying congress to immediately take action to change the industry and prevent other accidents from pilot fatigue.

In addition to increasing the minimum flight requirements for airline pilots, rest rules and regulations for commercial pilots were also revised in the wake of the Colgan Airlines accident. The new regulations require airline pilots to have at least ten hours of rest between their shifts, eight hours of which must be used for uninterrupted sleep (Trejos, 2014). Trejos (2014) also reveals that airline pilots are now limited to eight or nine hours of flight time and nine to fourteen hour duty periods, depending on when they are scheduled to fly as well as how many time zones the pilots will cross. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Michael Huerta, reveals that these new rules provide, "pilots enough time to get the rest they really need to safely get passengers to their destinations" ("Feds," 2011). The previous generation of rest regulations required pilots to have have a minimum of only eight hours between flying shifts with no requirement for uninterrupted sleep (Trejos, 2014). In other words, the previous regulations allowed pilots to use their eight hours to eat, shop, and explore, instead of appropriating some of the time for sleep only.

Interestingly, cargo pilots were excluded from the new pilot rest regulations, which took effect in January, 2014. While airline pilots are only allowed up to nine hours of flight time, cargo pilots are able to fly for up to sixteen hours (Pegues, 2015). Not only are cargo pilots working longer hours, but they are typically flying during night hours; the critical time period when the body is seeking sleep. Pegues (2015) also describes a report from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) which reveals that the air cargo industry would lose $13.6 billion and 7,000 jobs if the same rest rules for airline pilots were implemented. Consequently, major cargo carriers like UPS are trying to prevent the rules from taking effect while pilot unions at these companies are lobbying the FAA to implement them. The cargo pilot unions argue that cargo pilots face the same fatigue as airline pilots, and that the safety repercussions are just as serious (Trejos, 2014).

I think that cargo pilots have been excluded from these rules for purely monetary reasons. I think that the major cargo companies in the United States convinced congress that it would simply cost them too many jobs and too much money to implement the changes. Since cargo aircraft do not carry passengers, the public and congress perceive less risk. What they fail to realize is that a cargo aircraft plummeting to the ground is just as catastrophic as a passenger aircraft accident. The FAA seems to be united with these cargo carriers, as they note implementing the rules would cost cargo carriers another $214 million ("Feds," 2014).  

I do not agree with cargo carriers and the FAA on this issue. Cargo pilots are just as fatigued, if not more fatigued, than airline pilots. They are operating the same equipment, conducting the same job, and flying to the same airports as airline pilots, just with fewer occupants on-board. The fact that fewer lives are at stake on cargo aircraft is not an excuse. A large commercial aircraft, cargo or passenger, can wreak havoc on any city or industrial area. It makes no difference if the aircraft is full of people or packages; fatigue is still a danger for cargo pilots. I feel the FAA has done a poor job of managing this issue from a safety standpoint, valuing lost jobs and cost over real safety hazards.

From a pilot perspective, I think cargo pilots would welcome the new rest rules. A better rested pilot is more apt to perform optimally in every flying scenario. Especially given the fact that cargo pilots are flying through the night hours, the extra rest time would significantly increase the amount of quality sleep that these pilots could get. The bottom line is that cargo pilots are dealing with the same hazards and duties as airline pilots, and thus should be allotted the same rest regulations to promote safety across the board.

References

Feds extend pilots' rest time to avoid fatigue. (2011, December 21). Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-extend-pilots-rest-time-to-avoid-fatigue/

Pegues, J. (2015, February 24). Investigation: Why are cargo pilots excluded from new rest rules? Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/investigation-why-are-cargo-pilots-excluded-from-new-rest-rules/

Trejos, N. (2014, January 3). New pilot fatigue rules go into effect this weekend. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2014/01/03/pilot-fatigue-mandatory-rest-new-faa-rules/4304417/

Reforming the Third Class Medical

General Aviation (GA) medical reform has been gaining ground as the Pilot's Bill of Rights 2 (PBR2) traverses the aisles of the United States Congress. The current agenda for third class medical reform, from a GA standpoint, is to medically aqpprove more people to fly for recreational purposes (Tennyson, 2015). Today, all pilots, including those who fly on sunny weekends to get a $100 hamburger, are required to pass a third class medical exam in order to fly. Tennyson (2015) notes that the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), as well as many other organizations, have been lobbying congress to change the medical requirements for these recreational pilots. They assert that many pilots are medically disqualified from flying under the current regulations when they are fit to fly. The reform also aims to relieve the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from the burden of medically certifying recreational pilots while placing more responsibility on pilots and their personal doctors. Mark Baker, President of AOPA, remarks, "The legislation moves the responsibility for managing many health issues out of the FAA's bureaucracy, and puts it in the hands of pilots, where it belongs," and, "The Pilots Bill of Rights 2 frees pilots to work with their personal physicians to manage their own health, wellness and fitness to fly" (McMillin, 2015).

Third class medical reform is a significant component of PBR2, which was approved by the Senate in December 2015 (Bergqvist, 2015). In order to be fully implemented, it will need to be approved by the House, and finally signed into law by President Obama. As it is written, PBR2 will essentially eliminate the third class medical. Pilots flying recreational, non commercial flights with aircraft weighing less than 6,000 pounds and containing a maximum of six seats would no longer be required to visit an FAA medical examiner regularly. Other limitations imposed on these recreational pilots include flying at altitudes less than 18,000 feet, a maximum airspeed of 250 knots, and carrying no more than five passengers (Tennyson, 2015). Although the bill no longer requires a frequent visit to an FAA doctor, it still requires pilots to visit a general care physician at least once every four years and take an online aeromedical course every two years (Bergqvist, 2015).

One of the most attractive components of third class medical reform is that recreational pilots would only be required to visit a personal physician once every four years and make a record of it in their logbook. This reduces the costs for pilots who would otherwise be required to spend over $200 to visit an FAA medical examiner regularly. It also allows pilots to make a decision with their personal care doctors as to weather they are fit to fly. Personal physicians are probably more familiar with a given patient's medical issues and history, which better qualifies them to decide whether an airmen is fit to fly. This will also prevent many airmen from being disqualified from a minor medical condition that, when monitored and treated, is harmless. The only adverse aspect of this is that older pilots may not be evaluated as often as they should. The bill does not require a 90 year old airmen to visit their health care professional more than a 20 year old airmen. This could prove disastrous, as older pilots may develop a string of hazardous health conditions during the four year exam interval and legally continue flying. Thus, the new reform puts the decision to fly in the hands of airmen who may not be willing to forfeit their flying abilities just yet. It only takes one poor choice for the unthinkable to unravel.

I do not think medical reform is an absolute necessity. Since the FAA's core responsibility is to preserve and protect public interests, airmen will always have to be medically certified in some fashion. Airline pilots and other commercial pilots will always need to be medically cleared by the FAA to fly for hire. Thus, aeromedical infrastructure and testing standards will always exist. The third class medical reform, if implemented, will really only reduce the paperwork that the FAA medical divisions have to keep track of while saving recreational airmen a little money on medical exams. I think it will benefit the GA industry if more pilots are allowed to fly and even encourage those with previously disqualifying conditions to fly for recreation. With this, however, I think that older pilots with unsafe conditions may be allowed to fly, which could pose a safety hazard. In closing, pilots must be medically fit individuals to exercise the privilege of flying. We accept this immense responsibility each time we nestle into the flight deck. As long as the FAA is sufficiently monitoring the health of all airmen, recreational and commercial, using FAA examiners or personal physicians, the air transportation system will continue to operate safely.

References

Bergqvist, P. (2015, December 17). Senate passes third class medical reform. Retrieved from http://www.flyingmag.com/senate-passes-third-class-medical-reform

McMillin, M. (2015, December 11). Third class medical reform moves to Senate. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/awinbizav/third-class-medical-reform-moves-senate

Tennyson, E. (2015, February 26). Medical reform legislation introduced in House, Senate. Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/February/26/Medical-reform-legislation-introduced-in-House-and-Senate

Depression: A Pilot Problem?

On March 24th, 2015, Germanwings flight 4U 9525 departed Barcelona, Spain, for Dusseldorf, Germany. Reaching 38,000 feet, the Airbus A320 was flying on autopilot. Captain Patrick Sonderheimer and First Officer Andreas Lubitz were conversing normally; the flight was routine and uneventful thus far. Approximately 30 minutes later, the unthinkable occurred. The aircraft began a rapid, unexpected descent. Minutes later, the Airbus A320 impacted the ground in a mountainous region of France, killing all of the 150 passengers on board ("Alps plane," 2015). Data from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) reveals that just prior to the descent, Captain Sonderheimer left the flight deck to use the lavatory. The recording even picks up the sound of his chair sliding back as he exited. The CVR reveals that just moments later, Captain Sonderheimer was pleading with First Officer Lubitz to open the cockpit door. Sonderherimer was not able to gain access to the flight deck, but muffled banging sounds recorded by the CVR indicate he certainly did everything in his power to do so (Pfaffenbach, 2015). The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) reveals First Officer Lubitz actually programmed the descent, dialing in 100 feet in the altitude selector ("Alps plane," 2015). Airline policy did not require another crew member to replace Captain Sonderheimer when he left. Most airlines in the United States and around the world do not allow a single crew member to be in the cockpit at any given time. The investigations following this incident would shake the industry and expose startling gaps in airline policy.

Surprisingly, Lufthansa, the parent company of Germanwings, was completely unaware that Lubtiz was mentally unstable. Lubitz and Clark (2015) reveal that prior to beginning his initial training, he was treated by psychotherapists, as he had been exhibiting suicidal tendencies. Visiting numerous doctors for a wide array of psychological issues, Lubitz was recently deemed by health care professionals to be unfit to work . However, he failed to share this information with his employer, continuing to fly commercial airliners. Lufthansa had no idea Lubitz had such an array of mental health issues prior to receiving his initial pilot certificate, and they were unaware that his condition had been progressively deteriorating within the past few months (Kulish & Clark, 2015). Just before the flight, he had been searching for suicide methods and the workings of reinforced cockpit doors ("Germanwings crash," 2015).

The poster child for the Germanwings incident was Egyptair 990. The Boeing 767 aircraft departed New York and turned out over the ocean, bound for Cairo. Langewiesche (2001) reveals that at 33,000 feet, First Officer Gameel al-Batouti found himself in the flight deck alone after Captain Habashi visited the lavatory. Suddenly, al-Bouti retarded the throttles, sending the aircraft into a steep dive. Captain Habashi eventually made his way back up to the flight deck to stop the dive. He would end up battling al-Batouti on the controls with such force that the elevator split; one side was deflected upward while the other side downward. Langewiesche further explains how Habashi managed to level the aircraft at one point, but the 767 had already been subjected to such severe stress that it began to disintegrate over the ocean. All 217 passengers were killed. Investigators reveal that al-Batouti may have been in hot water with Egyptair upon his return to Cairo, serving as motive for bringing down the airliner. Although still under speculation, al-Batouti was also associated with various sexual misconduct cases which could have also served as motive (Langewiesche, 2001). Regardless of why al-Batouti crashed the aircraft, it is clear that he was mentally unstable, and that Egyptair did not suspect he was having any psychological issues.

In the United States, airmen medical certification is handled by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In order to exercise the privileges of an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, a pilot must pass a medical exam either every year or every six months, depending on age. Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) are required to evaluate the mental condition of the pilots they issue medical certificates to, but this usually only consists of a few simple questions. The problem is pilots can provide all the right answers to avoid further investigation by the AME and keep their wings when they really are depressed (Park, 2015). If an airmen is found to have a mental health issue, many airlines have installed programs to help pilots recover while allowing them to return to flying after they are rehabilitated. These programs are effective, but as Park (2015) notes, there is still no incentive for pilots to admit that they have a health issue, which makes addressing pilot depression difficult.

I do not think that significant reform is required to medically certify pilots to fly. Extensive mental tests are not the solution to determine if a pilot is mentally fit to fly. However, opening the channel of communication between doctors and AMEs is important. If a doctor deems an airmen unfit for duty, he or she should be able to send that information to the company that employs the pilot or an AME so that passenger lives are not endangered. I do not believe this communication link should be abused to tarnish the career of an airmen, but to help rehabilitate them and safely bring them back for duty assuming they meet medical certification standards. A separate reporting program within the FAA or various airlines should be created to foster this network. Implementing more mental health aid in the airline scene while promoting a, "see something, say something," mentality among other pilots would also serve as a more effective safety net. I also argue that instead of extreme mental testing, policies regarding one pilot in the flight deck should be scrutinized. It is a safety hazard to have only one person in the flight deck for a variety of reasons, however it is a more practical avenue to prevent mentally disturbed pilots from bringing their thoughts to fruition.

Again, intense mental screening for pilots is not the answer. Beyond the costs required to implement such testing, there is never a guarantee that the individual will not have a mental breakdown and commit a savage act after clearing a battery of psychological examinations. Intense medical screening is not even practical for the FAA. In order to implement such testing, they would need the assistance of thousands of psychologists and psychotherapists to sift through thousands of pilots. Given the fact that the FAA is struggling to even update the airspace system, the notion of such testing is frivolous. Not only would this testing cost the FAA, but it would also cost airlines in terms of personnel. With such a barrage of mental screening, the pool of potential pilots would likely diminish. Airmen pursuing the career would feel a sense of mistrust, while others would be deemed unfit to fly even though they are perfectly normal psychologically. Such liberal testing could further exacerbate the pilot shortage. In closing, policy change regarding the communication between doctors and AMEs as well as pilots leaving the cockpit is the answer, while intense mental health screening is not.

References

Alps plane crash: What happened? (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32035121

Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'practised rapid descent'. (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32604552

Kulish, N., & Clark, N. (2015, April 18). Germanwings crash exposes history of denial on risk of pilot suicide. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/europe/germanwings-plane-crash-andreas-lubitz-lufthansa-pilot-suicide.html?_r=0

Langewiesche, W. (2001, November). The crash of Egyptair 990. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/11/the-crash-of-egyptair-990/302332/

Park, A. (2015, March 26). How pilots are screened for depression and suicide. Retrieved from http://time.com/3760132/germanwings-plane-crash-pilot-suicide-andreas-lubitz/

Pfaffenbach, K. (2015, March 26). Police search home of Andreas Lubitz, co-pilot suspected of crashing germanwings flight. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/police-search-home-andreas-lubitz-co-pilot-who-crashed-a320-317035