Depression: A Pilot Problem?

On March 24th, 2015, Germanwings flight 4U 9525 departed Barcelona, Spain, for Dusseldorf, Germany. Reaching 38,000 feet, the Airbus A320 was flying on autopilot. Captain Patrick Sonderheimer and First Officer Andreas Lubitz were conversing normally; the flight was routine and uneventful thus far. Approximately 30 minutes later, the unthinkable occurred. The aircraft began a rapid, unexpected descent. Minutes later, the Airbus A320 impacted the ground in a mountainous region of France, killing all of the 150 passengers on board ("Alps plane," 2015). Data from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) reveals that just prior to the descent, Captain Sonderheimer left the flight deck to use the lavatory. The recording even picks up the sound of his chair sliding back as he exited. The CVR reveals that just moments later, Captain Sonderheimer was pleading with First Officer Lubitz to open the cockpit door. Sonderherimer was not able to gain access to the flight deck, but muffled banging sounds recorded by the CVR indicate he certainly did everything in his power to do so (Pfaffenbach, 2015). The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) reveals First Officer Lubitz actually programmed the descent, dialing in 100 feet in the altitude selector ("Alps plane," 2015). Airline policy did not require another crew member to replace Captain Sonderheimer when he left. Most airlines in the United States and around the world do not allow a single crew member to be in the cockpit at any given time. The investigations following this incident would shake the industry and expose startling gaps in airline policy.

Surprisingly, Lufthansa, the parent company of Germanwings, was completely unaware that Lubtiz was mentally unstable. Lubitz and Clark (2015) reveal that prior to beginning his initial training, he was treated by psychotherapists, as he had been exhibiting suicidal tendencies. Visiting numerous doctors for a wide array of psychological issues, Lubitz was recently deemed by health care professionals to be unfit to work . However, he failed to share this information with his employer, continuing to fly commercial airliners. Lufthansa had no idea Lubitz had such an array of mental health issues prior to receiving his initial pilot certificate, and they were unaware that his condition had been progressively deteriorating within the past few months (Kulish & Clark, 2015). Just before the flight, he had been searching for suicide methods and the workings of reinforced cockpit doors ("Germanwings crash," 2015).

The poster child for the Germanwings incident was Egyptair 990. The Boeing 767 aircraft departed New York and turned out over the ocean, bound for Cairo. Langewiesche (2001) reveals that at 33,000 feet, First Officer Gameel al-Batouti found himself in the flight deck alone after Captain Habashi visited the lavatory. Suddenly, al-Bouti retarded the throttles, sending the aircraft into a steep dive. Captain Habashi eventually made his way back up to the flight deck to stop the dive. He would end up battling al-Batouti on the controls with such force that the elevator split; one side was deflected upward while the other side downward. Langewiesche further explains how Habashi managed to level the aircraft at one point, but the 767 had already been subjected to such severe stress that it began to disintegrate over the ocean. All 217 passengers were killed. Investigators reveal that al-Batouti may have been in hot water with Egyptair upon his return to Cairo, serving as motive for bringing down the airliner. Although still under speculation, al-Batouti was also associated with various sexual misconduct cases which could have also served as motive (Langewiesche, 2001). Regardless of why al-Batouti crashed the aircraft, it is clear that he was mentally unstable, and that Egyptair did not suspect he was having any psychological issues.

In the United States, airmen medical certification is handled by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In order to exercise the privileges of an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, a pilot must pass a medical exam either every year or every six months, depending on age. Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) are required to evaluate the mental condition of the pilots they issue medical certificates to, but this usually only consists of a few simple questions. The problem is pilots can provide all the right answers to avoid further investigation by the AME and keep their wings when they really are depressed (Park, 2015). If an airmen is found to have a mental health issue, many airlines have installed programs to help pilots recover while allowing them to return to flying after they are rehabilitated. These programs are effective, but as Park (2015) notes, there is still no incentive for pilots to admit that they have a health issue, which makes addressing pilot depression difficult.

I do not think that significant reform is required to medically certify pilots to fly. Extensive mental tests are not the solution to determine if a pilot is mentally fit to fly. However, opening the channel of communication between doctors and AMEs is important. If a doctor deems an airmen unfit for duty, he or she should be able to send that information to the company that employs the pilot or an AME so that passenger lives are not endangered. I do not believe this communication link should be abused to tarnish the career of an airmen, but to help rehabilitate them and safely bring them back for duty assuming they meet medical certification standards. A separate reporting program within the FAA or various airlines should be created to foster this network. Implementing more mental health aid in the airline scene while promoting a, "see something, say something," mentality among other pilots would also serve as a more effective safety net. I also argue that instead of extreme mental testing, policies regarding one pilot in the flight deck should be scrutinized. It is a safety hazard to have only one person in the flight deck for a variety of reasons, however it is a more practical avenue to prevent mentally disturbed pilots from bringing their thoughts to fruition.

Again, intense mental screening for pilots is not the answer. Beyond the costs required to implement such testing, there is never a guarantee that the individual will not have a mental breakdown and commit a savage act after clearing a battery of psychological examinations. Intense medical screening is not even practical for the FAA. In order to implement such testing, they would need the assistance of thousands of psychologists and psychotherapists to sift through thousands of pilots. Given the fact that the FAA is struggling to even update the airspace system, the notion of such testing is frivolous. Not only would this testing cost the FAA, but it would also cost airlines in terms of personnel. With such a barrage of mental screening, the pool of potential pilots would likely diminish. Airmen pursuing the career would feel a sense of mistrust, while others would be deemed unfit to fly even though they are perfectly normal psychologically. Such liberal testing could further exacerbate the pilot shortage. In closing, policy change regarding the communication between doctors and AMEs as well as pilots leaving the cockpit is the answer, while intense mental health screening is not.

References

Alps plane crash: What happened? (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32035121

Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'practised rapid descent'. (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32604552

Kulish, N., & Clark, N. (2015, April 18). Germanwings crash exposes history of denial on risk of pilot suicide. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/europe/germanwings-plane-crash-andreas-lubitz-lufthansa-pilot-suicide.html?_r=0

Langewiesche, W. (2001, November). The crash of Egyptair 990. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/11/the-crash-of-egyptair-990/302332/

Park, A. (2015, March 26). How pilots are screened for depression and suicide. Retrieved from http://time.com/3760132/germanwings-plane-crash-pilot-suicide-andreas-lubitz/

Pfaffenbach, K. (2015, March 26). Police search home of Andreas Lubitz, co-pilot suspected of crashing germanwings flight. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/police-search-home-andreas-lubitz-co-pilot-who-crashed-a320-317035