Reforming the Third Class Medical

General Aviation (GA) medical reform has been gaining ground as the Pilot's Bill of Rights 2 (PBR2) traverses the aisles of the United States Congress. The current agenda for third class medical reform, from a GA standpoint, is to medically aqpprove more people to fly for recreational purposes (Tennyson, 2015). Today, all pilots, including those who fly on sunny weekends to get a $100 hamburger, are required to pass a third class medical exam in order to fly. Tennyson (2015) notes that the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), as well as many other organizations, have been lobbying congress to change the medical requirements for these recreational pilots. They assert that many pilots are medically disqualified from flying under the current regulations when they are fit to fly. The reform also aims to relieve the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from the burden of medically certifying recreational pilots while placing more responsibility on pilots and their personal doctors. Mark Baker, President of AOPA, remarks, "The legislation moves the responsibility for managing many health issues out of the FAA's bureaucracy, and puts it in the hands of pilots, where it belongs," and, "The Pilots Bill of Rights 2 frees pilots to work with their personal physicians to manage their own health, wellness and fitness to fly" (McMillin, 2015).

Third class medical reform is a significant component of PBR2, which was approved by the Senate in December 2015 (Bergqvist, 2015). In order to be fully implemented, it will need to be approved by the House, and finally signed into law by President Obama. As it is written, PBR2 will essentially eliminate the third class medical. Pilots flying recreational, non commercial flights with aircraft weighing less than 6,000 pounds and containing a maximum of six seats would no longer be required to visit an FAA medical examiner regularly. Other limitations imposed on these recreational pilots include flying at altitudes less than 18,000 feet, a maximum airspeed of 250 knots, and carrying no more than five passengers (Tennyson, 2015). Although the bill no longer requires a frequent visit to an FAA doctor, it still requires pilots to visit a general care physician at least once every four years and take an online aeromedical course every two years (Bergqvist, 2015).

One of the most attractive components of third class medical reform is that recreational pilots would only be required to visit a personal physician once every four years and make a record of it in their logbook. This reduces the costs for pilots who would otherwise be required to spend over $200 to visit an FAA medical examiner regularly. It also allows pilots to make a decision with their personal care doctors as to weather they are fit to fly. Personal physicians are probably more familiar with a given patient's medical issues and history, which better qualifies them to decide whether an airmen is fit to fly. This will also prevent many airmen from being disqualified from a minor medical condition that, when monitored and treated, is harmless. The only adverse aspect of this is that older pilots may not be evaluated as often as they should. The bill does not require a 90 year old airmen to visit their health care professional more than a 20 year old airmen. This could prove disastrous, as older pilots may develop a string of hazardous health conditions during the four year exam interval and legally continue flying. Thus, the new reform puts the decision to fly in the hands of airmen who may not be willing to forfeit their flying abilities just yet. It only takes one poor choice for the unthinkable to unravel.

I do not think medical reform is an absolute necessity. Since the FAA's core responsibility is to preserve and protect public interests, airmen will always have to be medically certified in some fashion. Airline pilots and other commercial pilots will always need to be medically cleared by the FAA to fly for hire. Thus, aeromedical infrastructure and testing standards will always exist. The third class medical reform, if implemented, will really only reduce the paperwork that the FAA medical divisions have to keep track of while saving recreational airmen a little money on medical exams. I think it will benefit the GA industry if more pilots are allowed to fly and even encourage those with previously disqualifying conditions to fly for recreation. With this, however, I think that older pilots with unsafe conditions may be allowed to fly, which could pose a safety hazard. In closing, pilots must be medically fit individuals to exercise the privilege of flying. We accept this immense responsibility each time we nestle into the flight deck. As long as the FAA is sufficiently monitoring the health of all airmen, recreational and commercial, using FAA examiners or personal physicians, the air transportation system will continue to operate safely.

References

Bergqvist, P. (2015, December 17). Senate passes third class medical reform. Retrieved from http://www.flyingmag.com/senate-passes-third-class-medical-reform

McMillin, M. (2015, December 11). Third class medical reform moves to Senate. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/awinbizav/third-class-medical-reform-moves-senate

Tennyson, E. (2015, February 26). Medical reform legislation introduced in House, Senate. Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/February/26/Medical-reform-legislation-introduced-in-House-and-Senate

Depression: A Pilot Problem?

On March 24th, 2015, Germanwings flight 4U 9525 departed Barcelona, Spain, for Dusseldorf, Germany. Reaching 38,000 feet, the Airbus A320 was flying on autopilot. Captain Patrick Sonderheimer and First Officer Andreas Lubitz were conversing normally; the flight was routine and uneventful thus far. Approximately 30 minutes later, the unthinkable occurred. The aircraft began a rapid, unexpected descent. Minutes later, the Airbus A320 impacted the ground in a mountainous region of France, killing all of the 150 passengers on board ("Alps plane," 2015). Data from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) reveals that just prior to the descent, Captain Sonderheimer left the flight deck to use the lavatory. The recording even picks up the sound of his chair sliding back as he exited. The CVR reveals that just moments later, Captain Sonderheimer was pleading with First Officer Lubitz to open the cockpit door. Sonderherimer was not able to gain access to the flight deck, but muffled banging sounds recorded by the CVR indicate he certainly did everything in his power to do so (Pfaffenbach, 2015). The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) reveals First Officer Lubitz actually programmed the descent, dialing in 100 feet in the altitude selector ("Alps plane," 2015). Airline policy did not require another crew member to replace Captain Sonderheimer when he left. Most airlines in the United States and around the world do not allow a single crew member to be in the cockpit at any given time. The investigations following this incident would shake the industry and expose startling gaps in airline policy.

Surprisingly, Lufthansa, the parent company of Germanwings, was completely unaware that Lubtiz was mentally unstable. Lubitz and Clark (2015) reveal that prior to beginning his initial training, he was treated by psychotherapists, as he had been exhibiting suicidal tendencies. Visiting numerous doctors for a wide array of psychological issues, Lubitz was recently deemed by health care professionals to be unfit to work . However, he failed to share this information with his employer, continuing to fly commercial airliners. Lufthansa had no idea Lubitz had such an array of mental health issues prior to receiving his initial pilot certificate, and they were unaware that his condition had been progressively deteriorating within the past few months (Kulish & Clark, 2015). Just before the flight, he had been searching for suicide methods and the workings of reinforced cockpit doors ("Germanwings crash," 2015).

The poster child for the Germanwings incident was Egyptair 990. The Boeing 767 aircraft departed New York and turned out over the ocean, bound for Cairo. Langewiesche (2001) reveals that at 33,000 feet, First Officer Gameel al-Batouti found himself in the flight deck alone after Captain Habashi visited the lavatory. Suddenly, al-Bouti retarded the throttles, sending the aircraft into a steep dive. Captain Habashi eventually made his way back up to the flight deck to stop the dive. He would end up battling al-Batouti on the controls with such force that the elevator split; one side was deflected upward while the other side downward. Langewiesche further explains how Habashi managed to level the aircraft at one point, but the 767 had already been subjected to such severe stress that it began to disintegrate over the ocean. All 217 passengers were killed. Investigators reveal that al-Batouti may have been in hot water with Egyptair upon his return to Cairo, serving as motive for bringing down the airliner. Although still under speculation, al-Batouti was also associated with various sexual misconduct cases which could have also served as motive (Langewiesche, 2001). Regardless of why al-Batouti crashed the aircraft, it is clear that he was mentally unstable, and that Egyptair did not suspect he was having any psychological issues.

In the United States, airmen medical certification is handled by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In order to exercise the privileges of an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, a pilot must pass a medical exam either every year or every six months, depending on age. Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) are required to evaluate the mental condition of the pilots they issue medical certificates to, but this usually only consists of a few simple questions. The problem is pilots can provide all the right answers to avoid further investigation by the AME and keep their wings when they really are depressed (Park, 2015). If an airmen is found to have a mental health issue, many airlines have installed programs to help pilots recover while allowing them to return to flying after they are rehabilitated. These programs are effective, but as Park (2015) notes, there is still no incentive for pilots to admit that they have a health issue, which makes addressing pilot depression difficult.

I do not think that significant reform is required to medically certify pilots to fly. Extensive mental tests are not the solution to determine if a pilot is mentally fit to fly. However, opening the channel of communication between doctors and AMEs is important. If a doctor deems an airmen unfit for duty, he or she should be able to send that information to the company that employs the pilot or an AME so that passenger lives are not endangered. I do not believe this communication link should be abused to tarnish the career of an airmen, but to help rehabilitate them and safely bring them back for duty assuming they meet medical certification standards. A separate reporting program within the FAA or various airlines should be created to foster this network. Implementing more mental health aid in the airline scene while promoting a, "see something, say something," mentality among other pilots would also serve as a more effective safety net. I also argue that instead of extreme mental testing, policies regarding one pilot in the flight deck should be scrutinized. It is a safety hazard to have only one person in the flight deck for a variety of reasons, however it is a more practical avenue to prevent mentally disturbed pilots from bringing their thoughts to fruition.

Again, intense mental screening for pilots is not the answer. Beyond the costs required to implement such testing, there is never a guarantee that the individual will not have a mental breakdown and commit a savage act after clearing a battery of psychological examinations. Intense medical screening is not even practical for the FAA. In order to implement such testing, they would need the assistance of thousands of psychologists and psychotherapists to sift through thousands of pilots. Given the fact that the FAA is struggling to even update the airspace system, the notion of such testing is frivolous. Not only would this testing cost the FAA, but it would also cost airlines in terms of personnel. With such a barrage of mental screening, the pool of potential pilots would likely diminish. Airmen pursuing the career would feel a sense of mistrust, while others would be deemed unfit to fly even though they are perfectly normal psychologically. Such liberal testing could further exacerbate the pilot shortage. In closing, policy change regarding the communication between doctors and AMEs as well as pilots leaving the cockpit is the answer, while intense mental health screening is not.

References

Alps plane crash: What happened? (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32035121

Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'practised rapid descent'. (2015, May 6). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32604552

Kulish, N., & Clark, N. (2015, April 18). Germanwings crash exposes history of denial on risk of pilot suicide. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/europe/germanwings-plane-crash-andreas-lubitz-lufthansa-pilot-suicide.html?_r=0

Langewiesche, W. (2001, November). The crash of Egyptair 990. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/11/the-crash-of-egyptair-990/302332/

Park, A. (2015, March 26). How pilots are screened for depression and suicide. Retrieved from http://time.com/3760132/germanwings-plane-crash-pilot-suicide-andreas-lubitz/

Pfaffenbach, K. (2015, March 26). Police search home of Andreas Lubitz, co-pilot suspected of crashing germanwings flight. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/police-search-home-andreas-lubitz-co-pilot-who-crashed-a320-317035

Air Traffic Control Privatization

The National Airspace System (NAS) is primarily comprised of ground based stations that direct air traffic from airport to airport, point to point, through the airspace over the United States of America. The system is based on radar technology developed well over 70 years ago, as well as ground based navigation facilities like the VOR and NDB. These traditional facilities are connected by airways, like highways in the sky. The problem with ground based navigation technology and these airways is that they require aircraft to fly longer routes and burn more fuel. This is due to the fact that these airways and navigation stations rarely provide the most direct routing to a given airport.

To meet the predicted growth of air traffic while reducing flight time and fuel burn, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing an overhaul of the airspace system, which they call NextGen. The NextGen system relies on satellite and Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to provide more direct route structures and provide unparalleled efficiency (Green, 2015). For instance, the NextGen system will allow aircraft to descend continuously from cruise to the approach environment instead of a series of descents that look like the steps of a stair case (Hasley, 2014). The satellites will also permit digital communication systems, which allow text message exchanges between pilots and controllers to relieve frequency congestion and increase overall system efficiency (Green, 2015). With this restructuring, the FAA and lawmakers have been contemplating the privatization of Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) to reduce the monumental costs of running the airspace system.

Wood (2015) reveals that General Aviation (GA) pilots have traditionally opposed efforts to privatize ATC since they are concerned that it will open the door to user fees. These fees would be applied to pilots for using ATC services. Many are concerned these user fees would facilitate the destruction of GA given the already impressive costs associated with flying. Wood also explains that the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has opposed ATC privatization for many years, as they fear it will lead to a departure from current system principles which give equal priority to all aircraft. Furthermore, Wood divulges the fact that the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) is also opposed to user fees associated with privatization, but they are also opposed for safety reasons. EAA leaders note that privatization may, "penalize the prudent practice of using ATC services, such as filing for IFR in marginal conditions or simply receiving VFR advisories" (Wood, 2015).

On the other side of the aisle, most major airlines and cargo operators support ATC privatization. Jansen (2015) reveals executives at American Airlines, Jetblue Airlines, Southwest Airlines, FedEx, and Atlas, to name a few, are pushing for privatization. The reason behind this support is primarily cost savings. These operators are looking to reduce the costs of ATC and spread them out using the user fees that the GA industry is strongly opposed to. These carriers also support the privatization effort since they claim it will expedite the overall modernization of the airspace under NextGen and further promote overall efficiency (Jansen, 2015).

Interestingly, Delta Airlines is opposed to ATC privatization. They note that the although the privatized ATC system in Canada is effective, it does not provide significant optimization or cost savings (Jansen, 2015). The system in Canada relies on fees from pilots and airlines to pay for controllers. In return, the government and various industry leaders oversee the ATC system and its development. Jansen (2015) remarks that Delta officials argue ATC privatization will not be an immediate fix for a broken system, and that the current system is more flexible in handling unforeseen issues, such as weather.

 According to Wood (2015), the current push for ATC privatization came form Representative Bill Shuster of the House Infrastructure and Transportation Committee, and is now a component of the upcoming FAA re-authorization bill. The privatization proposal within the re-authorization bill would separate ATC from the federal budget and transform it into a separate entity with heavy FAA oversight (Wood, 2015). Congress will vote on the bill in a few months, as the FAA budget has only been extended through March, 2016 (Wynbrandt, 2015). Congress will be debating this controversial topic while air carriers and GA organizations battle for control over this piece of legislation.

I do not believe that a privatized ATC system will be more efficient or beneficial to the aviation industry in the United States. In fact, I believe it will have many negative impacts. The primary issue with a private entity is its goal; to make money. Thus, every entity with the goal of making money will be forced to cut corners in order to save money. Ultimately, I believe that this will lead to a lapse in training, hiring, and ultimately safety. Parallel to privatized prisons in this country, I foresee privatized ATC facilities cutting wages and increasing duty periods. Not only does this jeopardize safety, but it discourages the brightest and best individuals from pursuing a career in ATC. From an airmen standpoint, privatization will also discourage pilots from using ATC services, as they will try to avoid incurring more costs than they already are. The increased costs will also deter student pilots from pursuing aviation as a career or for leisure, reducing the number of certificated pilots. I am astonished that the airline industry, during one of the greatest pilot shortages in history, is not concerned that introducing privatized ATC and associated user fees will strangle the already diminishing stream of professional pilots flowing to them. Thus, privatizing the ATC system is a terrible idea.

References

Green, P. (2015, September 28). America’s air traffic control system is finally going digital. Retrieved from http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/09/25/americas-air-traffic-control-system-is-finally-going-digital.html

Halsey, A. (2014, November 19). FAA rolls out taste of NextGen air traffic control system in Dallas. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/faa-rolls-out-taste-of-nextgen-in-dallas/2014/11/19/13a5210e-7017-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html

Jansen, B. (2015, December 2). Airline executives urge privatization of air-traffic control. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/01/airline-executives-urge-privatization-air-traffic-control/76604766/

Wood, J. (2015, July 8). Call to action issued over ATC privatization. Retrieved from http://generalaviationnews.com/2015/07/08/call-to-action-issued-over-atc-privatization/

Wynbrandt, J. (2015, November 17). Bolen calls to block airlines’ push for ATC privatization. Retrieved from http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2015-11-17/bolen-calls-block-airlines-push-atc-privatization

My Aviation Story

My aviation interests blossomed from early experiences flying on commercial airliners. From these experiences, I developed a fascination with airplanes. The airport environment, the flight crew, and the aircraft were captivating. I was the child bickering and scheming to earn a window seat on every flight, as I could not resist peering into the seemingly magical world that existed only a few inches from my face. As I grew this infatuation continued. Driving past airports was a treat, and watching the aircraft soaring overhead was exciting. Around the age of eight, while everyone else wanted to be a police officer or doctor, I knew I wanted to be an airline pilot.

Several years later, I was finally able to begin flying lessons. My first flight lesson was in late August, 2010, in New Hudson, Michigan. Upon completing my first lesson, I was convinced that becoming a professional pilot was within reach. Two years later, I would earn my first pilot certificate at 17 years of age. After graduating from Novi High School in 2013, I enrolled in the aviation program at Eastern Michigan University to continue flight training and earn a degree in aviation.

Today, I am pursuing a Bachelor of Science in Aviation Flight Technology from Eastern Michigan University. I will graduate in April 2016. I also instruct at Eagle Flight Center to build flight experience. I still need to complete my commercial multi-engine training in order to graduate.

My plan is to continue instructing at Eagle Flight Center until I have 1,500 hours of flight time. Then I plan on flying for Endeavor Air Lines, as they have a Detroit base and are one of the highest paying regional carriers. I plan on remaining at Endeavor until I have the experience to fly for a major airline. My goal is to fly for Delta Air Lines for the remainder of my career.

With regard to guest speakers, I am interested in learning about the transition from general aviation aircraft to transport category aircraft. I would also like to learn more about life as a regional and mainline pilot. With respect to course topics, I am interested in exploring the current issues with automation in aviation as well as the potential impact of the upcoming pilot shortage on the airline industry.